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LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTION OF CREDITOR
POWERS AND REMEDIES: A CASE STUDY
OF THE NEGOTIATION AND DRAFTING
OF THE WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT
Jeffrey Davis*

W

ITH the vast growth of consumer credit in the United States,
followed by the growth of sympathy for the consumer, it
became increasingly clear in the mid-1960's that the time for comprehensive consumer credit legislation was near. To encourage the
passage of uniform legislation, the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws established the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury to draft the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (DCCC). Although some preliminary work had already been done, serious efforts began in 1965.
The UCCC went through eight preliminary drafts, and comments
were sought from all sectors of the consumer-credit community.1 The
ninth and final draft was approved in 1968 and, after minor modifications, was published in 1969.2
Although the UCCC initially met with consumer approval,3 the
hoped-for general support was not to be. Criticism began to mount,
and much of the initial support was withdrawn. The UCCC has been
criticized for, among other things, having been funded primarily by
lenders,4 allowing excessively high interest rates, 5 and failing to provide effective private remedies for consumers.6 In general, the criticism
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Dakota. B.S. 1965, UCLA; J.D.
1972, Loyola University of Los Angeles; LL.M. 1973, University of Michigan.-Ed.
I. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note, xxi-xxii.
2. The modifications were to conform with the provisions of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, as amended, Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-81t (1970), 18 u.s.c. §§ 891-96 (1970)). See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE,
Prefatory Note, xvii-xix.
3. Stengel, Should States Adopt the Uniform Consumer Credit Code?, 60 KY. L.J. 8,
~Q~~

.

4. Id. at 40; Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 298,
299-300 (1969). Murphy considers these attacks to have been unfair.
5. A Consumer Credit Code .•• for Lenders, 34 CONSUMER REPORTS, March 1969,
at 121, 121-22. The UCCC provides for maximum annual interest rates of 36 per cent
on small loans and 24 per cent on revolving accounts. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§§ 2.201, .207.
6. Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew
Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAw. 1039 (1968); James &: Fragomen, Uniform Consumer
Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V and VI, 57 GEO, L.J. 923 (1969);
Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1969).

[3]
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has centered around an alleged failure to restrict creditor powers
and practices sufficiently.7
The most significant anti-UCCC action was taken by the National
Consumer Law Center. 8 Following a conference of some fifty-five
consumer experts on June 20, 1969, at which the consensus was that
the UCCC was inadequate and required substantial revision, the
Center undertook to develop what was, in its view, an adequate
code.9 With the aid of a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity, it drafted the National Consumer Act (NCA), published in
1970.

Unlike the UCCC, the NCA admittedly demonstrated little concern for attracting creditor support.10 It was drafted in six months,
primarily by a committee consisting solely of avowed consumer
advocates,11 with apparently little dispute as to what it would contain.12 The published form of the NCA was the first draft to be
generally distributed and the first draft upon which general comment
was solicited. Predictably, the NCA extended well beyond the UCCC
in restricting creditor powers and remedies and in creating consumer
enforcement tools. It was acclaimed by some as preferable to the
UCCC,13 but even its supporters admitted that it was often guilty of
overkill.14 It was, of course, roundly criticized by others.10 Recently, the National Consumer Law Center has published the successor to the NCA-the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA).
7, See H. KruPKE, CoNSU!IIBR CREDIT: TEXT-CASES-MATERIALS 58-62 (1970); Harper,
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 53 (1969);
Murphy, supra note 4, at 299; Turner, The UCCC: A Credit Code for Business, 60
KY. L.J. 49 (1971).
8. The Center was formerly associated with Boston College Law School. Its offices
are presently located at I Court St., Boston, Mass. 02108.
9. NATIONAL CoNSU!IIBR Ac:r, Prefatory Note, iii-iv.
10. In fact, one of the most significant factors contributing to the creation of the
NCA was the feeling of its proponents that the UCCC draftsmen, concerned with
political considerations, did little more than draft a codification of existing credit
practices. NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r, Prefatory Note, iii. See also Willier, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code: What Should Legal Services Attorneys Do?, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE
R.Ev. 33 (1969).
11. NATIONAL CoNSU!IIBR Acr, Prefatory Note, iv. The special committee consisted
of representatives of the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, AFL-CIO,
AFL-UAW, and various legal service organizations.
12. NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r, Prefatory Note, app. B, at vii.
13. See Turner, supra note 7; Comment, Consumer Protection Under the UCCC
and the NGA-A Comparison and Recommendations, 12 Aruz. L. R.Ev. 572 (1970).
14. See Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the
Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. R.Ev. 302, 336 (1972); Comment, supra
note 13, at 581.
15. See, e.g., Moo, New Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach-The UCCC
or NCA?, 2 URBAN LAw. 439 (1970).
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While the MCCA often departs from the NCA, its approach to
consumer-credit problems is substantially the same.
The battle over consumer-credit reform is now raging in the state
legislatures.16 Most states have considered or are presently considering the DCCC for possible enactment. To date, seven have adopted
it in some form.17 A few legislatures will probably see some form of
the MCCA in the near future. There is, however, a third consumercredit package that deserves serious consideration-the Wisconsin
Consumer Act (WCA).1 8
In contrast to the UCCC and the MCCA, the WCA is an actual
statute, the product of six intense months of negotiation and drafting.
The initial version of the WCA had been introduced in the Wisconsin Assembly in early 1971 as Assembly Bill 105719 (Original A.B.
1057). Its provisions relating to consumer-credit transactions did not
differ substantially from those of the NCA.20 In its final form, the
16. The enactment of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-321, 82 Stat. 146, as amended, Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508,
§ 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-8lt (1970), 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970)),
applied pressure to the states to revise their consumer credit laws. Section 123 of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1970), allows the Federal Reserve Board to "exempt from the
requirements of this part [15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-65 (1970)] any class of credit transactions
within any State if it determines that under the law of that State that class of trans-

actions is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this
part, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement." See UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note, xxii-xxili.
17. They are Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.
l CCH CoNSUMER CREDIT Guml!: 1f 4770 (1973).
18. Wisconsin Consumer Act, ch. 239, [1971] Wis. Laws 3688 (codified at WIS. STAT.
§§ 421.101-427.105 (1971)). In this Article, these sections of the Wisconsin Statutes will
be referred to as sections of the Wisconsin Consumer Act.
The WCA was based on the NCA. However, the substantive changes that resulted
from negotiation and redrafting are so pervasive that its resemblance to the NCA is at
best slight. I have no qualms about designating the WCA as a third package.
Strictly speaking, the WCA is not solely a consumer-credit package. Although most
of its provisions apply to consumer-credit transactions, it applies as well to sales
solicited and contracted away from the regular place of business of the merchant.
Wisconsin Consumer Act §§,423.201-.205.
19. The bill was introduced by Representative liarout Sanasarian (D-Milwaukee),
chairman of the Commerce and Consumer Affairs Committee. Sections 1 through 28
of the bill would have repealed various statutes and made other technical changes
necessitated by the addition of the consumer-credit law. Section 29 contains the sub•
stantive provisions and would have created chapters 421 through 427 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, In this Article citations to the original bill will be to the proposed sections
contained in section 29 (e.g., A.B. 1057, § 421.101).
20, Original A.B, 1057 differed significantly from the NCA in many provisions other
than, those dealing with consumer-credit transactions. The NCA's treatment of con•
sumer-approval transactions was completely revamped. Compare NATIONAL CONSUMER
Acr §§ 2.501-.505 with A.B. 1057, §§ 423.201-.212. The NCA provisions regarding a
council of advisors on consumer affairs, administrative procedure, and judicial review
(sections 6.301-.414) and regarding credit-reporting agencies (sections 8.101-.303) were
eliminated.
Regarding consumer-credit transactions, there were only nvo significant differences

6
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WCA was over sixty per cent longer than Original A.B. 1057, and
the majority of its provisions had been substantially redrafted.
The WCA is unique in that its provisions were arduously negotiated under political circumstances that put the consumer representatives in a strong bargaining position. In fact, the strength of the
consumer position in Wisconsin may never be duplicated again. At
the same time, the bargaining position of Wisconsin creditors was
not weak, although it was weaker than that in which creditors usually stand. The vast financial resources of the creditor representatives, especially compared to those of the consumer representatives,
their political influence, and the consequent need for their support
were apparent throughout the drafting process.
Accordingly, the WCA represents a solution in which consumercreditor interests are uniquely balanced. It goes further to protect
consumer interests than any other such legislation in the country; yet
it eventually won the support of the great majority of creditors
within the state.21 Certainly, it is not without its flaws, both technical
and substantive. But equally certainly, it is a significant event in the
struggle to realign the relationship between creditor and consumer.
This Article discusses the background, negotiation, and drafting
of selected WCA restrictions on creditor powers and remedies and
compares those provisions to the analogous restrictions proposed by
other reform measures. In addition to the UCCC, the MCCA and
the WCA, two other major works must be considered in any discussion of consumer-credit legislation. First is Working Redraft No.
4 of the UCCC (UCCC Redraft). 22 This proposed revision, published
in December 1972, represents a marked change in the UCCC. Many
provisions favorable to the consumer have been added, and many of
the parallel provisions on sales and loans have been consolidated.
Although it is not an official recommendation, it indicates the current thinking of the UCCC Special Committee. Second is the Report
of the National Commission on Consumer Finance (Commission Rebetween the NCA and A.B. 1057. First, whereas the NCA regulates credit insurance
(sections 4.101-.304), A.B. 1057 simply prohibited the charge of any fee or premium for
such insurance (section 422.418). Second, the NCA provisions regulating liability for
use of credit cards (sections 2.601-.605) were not included irt A.B. 1057,
'
21. Among the credit groups supporting the Act in its final form were: Wisconsin
Credit Union League, Wisconsin Bankers' Association, Wisconsin Retail Merchants'
Association, Wisconsin Installment Bankers' Association, Wisconsin Consumer Finance
Association, Wisconsin Farm Implement Dealers' Association, and Wisconsin State
Chamber of Commerce. Crandall, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Wisconsin Consumer
Credit Laws Before and After, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 334, 334-35 n.6 (1973).
22. UNIFOIUII CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Working Redraft. No. 4, 1972).
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port).23 The Commission, established by title IV of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act,24 submitted the report on December 31, 1972,
after three years of study.
My objective in this Article is twofold. First, the discussion may
enable the reader to understand the objectives of the WCA restrictions on creditors' rights and remedies and the interests that they are
likely to affect. Second, by looking closely at the evolution of the
WCA in the context of specific issues, it may be possible to determine
whether the WCA can serve as a model for consumer-credit reform
movements in other states.

I.

THE SURVEY

Although the advice and recommendations of many groups were
sought, the primary negotiating and nearly all of the drafting was
done by representatives of banks,25 retail merchants,26 consumer
finance companies,27 and consumers.28 To discover the motives behind the negotiated changes, I interviewed these key negotiators.
It was necessary to focus on selected portions of the Act; because of
their notoriety and likely impact on the consumer-credit industry,
the Act's limitations on creditor practices and remedies were the
focus of the inquiry. In each case, the negotiator was asked to describe
the chronology of the change, the groups for and against the change,
the alternatives considered, and the reason for the action taken. To
ensure accuracy, the negotiators then reviewed and commented upon
a draft of the Article. Their comments were incorporated into the
final version.
II.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE NEGOTIATION AND

OF THE

p ASSAGE

WCA

Until 1970, Wisconsin retail merchants assumed that a revolving
credit sale was not subject to the Wisconsin twelve per cent per year
usury limitation. Under the age-old time-price doctrine, if the price
23. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES (1972) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
24. Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 164, as amended, Act of July 20, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-344, 84 Stat. 440.
25. The primary bank negotiator was Lawrence J. Bugge of Milwaukee.
26. Retail merchants were chiefly represented by John S. Holbrook, Jr., and Boris
Auerbach.
27. Consumer finance companies were primarily represented by Edward J. Heiser,
Jr. For Heiser's analysis of the WCA and a discussion of some of the problems that
may arise, see Heiser, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: A Critical Analysis, - MARQ. L.
REV. - (1973).
28. The unquestioned consumer leader and, for much of the time, the sole consumer negotiator was Thomas D. Crandall of Milwaukee Legal Services.
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of goods was not to be paid at the time of the purchase, any increase
in the amount due when paid was not considered a finance charge.
Rather, it was simply considered to be a natural increase in the purchase price resulting from the delayed payment.20 In October 1970,
this house of cards collapsed for Wisconsin merchants who offered
goods for sale on revolving credit. In State v. J.C. Penney Co.,80 the
Wisconsin supreme court, looking behind the form of revolving
charge accounts to their substance, found that such accounts do indeed amount to a forbearance of money and not a time sale.81
The decision had a severe impact on all Wisconsin retailers who
offered open-end credit plans; these were principally the large re•
tailers.82 The impact was twofold. First, the retailers were forced to
limit finance charges on open-end accounts to one per cent per
month. This substantial reduction in income, not coupled with
a reduction in overhead, was a severe blow, which put the profitability
of open-end plans in serious doubt. The second and perhaps more
significant result was that the retailers immediately became poten•
tially subject to great liability for past violations of the usury limita29. See, e.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 118-19 (1861).
30. 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970), noted in '71 CoLUM. L. REV. 905 (1971):
2 CUMB.-SAM. L. REv. 234 (1971); 54 MARQ. L. REV. 223 (1971); 69 MICH. L. REV. 1868
(1971); 55 MINN. L. REv. 1244 (1971).
31. Quoting at length from the trial court opinion analyzing the Penney revolving
charge contract, the court listed the following factors as among those tending to show
that the agreement is not a traditional time-price sale: (1) The customer may elect to
pay cash and lower the cost even after service charges have begun; (2) the contract is
not entered into in connection with a specific sale; (3) the e.;:tension of credit is based
on the purchaser's ability to pay; (4) the sale of goods is absolute, with creation of a
debt as consideration therefor; (5) there may be multiple sales with debt to the account
and also credit for payments; (6) the "service charge" is not fixed and independent of
the amount owed; (7) the customer is not quoted a time sale price as well as a cash
price; (8) the "service charge" is not a penalty intended to induce prompt payment;
and (9) the sales tax is computed on the cash price. 48 Wis. 2d at 144-50, 179 N.W.2d
at 651-54.
The South Dakota supreme court came to the same conclusion in Rollinger v. J.C.
Penney Co., - S.D. -, 192 N.W.2d 699 (1971). See Note, Interest Incognito-Usury
Statute Applied to Revolving Charge Account Agreement, 34 U. P11T. L. REv. 54 (1972)
(discussing both Penney cases). A recent Iowa supreme court decision followed
the Wisconsin court. See State ex rel. Turner v. Younger Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550
(1973). However, no other state has followed the Wisconsin decision. See Sliger v.
R.H. Macy &: Co., 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1971); Maine Merchants Assn. v.
Campbell, 287 A.2d 430 (Me. 1972); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Williams, Ind. App.-, 288 N.E.2d 170 (1972); Kass v. Garfinckel, Brooks Bros., Miller&: Rhoads,
Inc., 299 A.2d 542 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973). See also Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31
N.Y.2d 443, 45'7, 293 N.E.2d 80, 88, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908, 918-19 (1972).
32. The decision had little impact on small retailers. Those who carried their own
credit normally made only closed-end credit sales, which were apparently still outside
the operation of the usury statute. Any open-end credit available from these merchants
was normally offered through bank credit cards, which had always been subject to
usury restrictions.
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tions.83 Litigation under the usury statutes, in addition to being a
nuisance, would involve large legal costs and, more significantly,
could produce a continuous stream of unfavorable publicity. One
solution to these problems lay in the legislature. As of October 1970,
the large retailers were primarily interested in obtaining passage of
legislation that would eliminate the retroactive application of usury
penalties to revolving sales accounts.
At the same time, Wisconsin banks hoped to obtain an exemption
from the usury laws for their open-end credit plans. Apparently, because of the high cost of handling thousands of small drafts, growth
of bank credit cards in Wisconsin would have been considerably inhibited if there had been no increase in the permissible finance
charge.34
In early 1971, through the efforts of the large retailers, S.B. 277,
a bill prohibiting retroactive application of the usury penalties, was
introduced into the Wisconsin legislature. Similarly, through the
efforts of the Wisconsin Installment Bankers Association, A.B. 492, a
bill increasing allowable finance charges on revolving accounts, was
also introduced.
Meanwhile, consumer finance companies, long dissatisfied with
the Wisconsin rate restrictions on licensed loans,35 succeeded, in June
1971, in obtaining passage of a bill that relaxed these restrictions
temporarily. 30 The increased rates were to remain in effect until
July 1973, by which time the legislature would presumably have
considered the matter more thoroughly. 37
The next significant event in the pre-WCA maneuvering occurred
in October 1971. Nearly two years before, the Wisconsin legislature
had established an advisory committee to examine the UCCC and
recommend the changes, if any, that should be made prior to enactment. The committee initially set out to strengthen the UCCC consumer protections; however, a severe split of opinion developed over
33. Wis. STAT. § 138.06 (1971) provides various remedies and penalties for loans in
violation of the usury limitations. These may amount to as much as the total principal,
interest, and charges paid during the two years prior to suit. Wis. STAT. § 138.06(3)
(1971).
34. Conversation with Bill Dixon, Vice-President of First Wisconsin National
Bank, head of the Credit Card Division, February 28, 1973.
35. Since consumer finance companies borrow most of the money they lend, the
increases in the prime rate during the 1960's had significantly reduced profit margins.
Hence, they sought similar increases in the rates chargeable to consumers.
36. See Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 8, 1971, at 36, col. 1.
37. Id. Originally, the finance companies succeeded in obtaining passage of a
permanent rate increase bill in both houses. However, Governor Lucey vetoed the bill,
and the finance companies were forced to settle for a temporary increase.
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how much strengthening was needed. On October 4, 1971, two
consumer representatives on the committee walked out in protest
over the apparent acceptance of the UCCC. They reportedly charged
that the UCCC was "nearly worthless" from the standpoint of consumer protection and that the other committee members were committed to "recommending legislation favorable only to creditors. "88
The nine remaining representatives continued putting the final
touches on their recommendation.
Later in October, Governor Patrick J. Lucey, referring specifically to A.B. 492 and S.B. 277, officially informed the legislature
that he was opposed to piecemeal consumer legislation and that he
did not think legislation beneficial to lenders appropriate without
added statutory protection for the consumer.89 He further advised
the legislature to take up A.B. 1057. On October 26, the assembly
began to work on A.B. I 057, but, due to a flood of proposed amendments, consideration of the bill was postponed until the January
session.
Thus, at the end of 1971, the retail merchants sought protection
from retroactive application of the usury penalties, the banks sought
rate increases for their revolving charge plans ancJ. for their small
loans, and the consumer finance companies hoped to make the rate
increases they had obtained in July permanent. However, the Governor's position made it clear that special interest legislation would be
unavailable outside the framework of a comprehensive consumercredit package. In addition, consumer advocates recognized that the
passage of protective legislation would require substantial creditor
support. But the complete breakdown between the consumer representatives and other members of the UCCC advisory committee
showed that the UCCC could not serve as the catalyst. For these reasons, a consumer-creditor coalition, which had begun to materiali~e
as early as the summer of 1971, slowly took shape in the hope that,
through negotiation, A.B. 1057 could be molded into a form that
could be supported by all.
The negotiations took place in two clearly discernible stages.
Well before Governor Lucey's official communication to the legislature, the banks had known of his desire for comprehensive legislation, his support of A.B. 1057, and his confidence in its proponents.
Hence, in August 1971, the bank representatives began conferring
38. Wis. St. J., Oct. 5, 1971, § 2, at 3, col. I. One of the creditor negotiators told
me that he thinks this was simply a grandstand play intended to generate support for
A.B. 1057. He also thinks it worked.
39. Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 8, 1971, at 36, col. 4.
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with the proponents of A.B. 1057 to see if a compromise was possible. With the mutual discovery that they could work together, serious negotiations began in September; representatives of retail
merchants joined the discussions a few weeks later. The issue of
third-party creditor immunity became the testing ground for the
fragile coalition, so the successful resolution of this problem set the
tone for subsequent negotiations. The first round of negotiations
ended in December.40 The fruits of the negotiators' labor were assembled, and A.B. 1057, as modified, was distributed throughout the
credit community.
The second stage of the negotiations took place in January 1972.
Although suggestions and arguments were put forth by numerous
credit groups-credit unions, farm implement dealers, and savings
and loan associations-and the banks and retailers continued their
involvement, the primary input at this stage came from consumer
finance company representatives.
Notably absent from the negotiations, although their participation was solicited, were representatives of the large manufacturer-affiliated automobile finance companies and the Wisconsin automobile
dealers. Their unwillingness to join the coalition is easily understood. Since the prevailing interest rates in the Wisconsin automobile credit market were substantially below the statutory limits, the
automobile interests needed no rate relief. In addition, they were unaffected by the Penney case. They made their opposition to the WCA
clear throughout the negotiations, apparently assuming they could
prevent its passage. This assumption was, of course, incorrect. Although the automobile finance companies and the dealers worked
hard to defeat the bill41 and did succeed in getting one amendment
passed,42 the WCA was adopted substantially as submitted.
The effect of this group's failure to participate in the negotiations is quite a speculative matter. On many critical issues they were
represented only to the extent that the banks, which also finance
automobile sales, shared their interests. The banks, however, sought
gains in other areas and were willing to compromise the interests
shared ·with the automobile finance group for the sake of other concerns. Throughout the negotiations and the battle in the legislature,
40. As of December, the bank-retailer-consumer combination was beginning to bog
down. Having made a number of substantial concessions and having obtained substantial concessions in return, individual negotiators began to lose their ability to persuade.
Although all issues had not been resolved, it was time to get some new blood into
the negotiations.
41. Crandall, supra note 21, at 334-35 n.6.
42. See text accompanying notes 250-51 infra.
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passage of the bill was in doubt. The automobile finance companies
and the automobile dealers could certainly have exacted substantial
consumer concessions in exchange for their support. What those concessions might have been cannot be known. 43
On the whole, however, the Act represents an extraordinary individual and collective effort, put forth by people searching for common ground, while diligently representing often quite divergent interests. In its final form, the WCA had the support of most credit
organizations and nearly all consumer groups.44 After a difficult battle in the legislature45 that resulted in only a few substantive changes,
the Wisconsin Consumer Act was passed and signed into law on
March 29, 1972. It went into effect on March 1, 1973.
III.
A.

NEGOTIATING THE

WCA

The Elimination of Third-Party Creditor Immunity

The negotiations began with one of the most notorious consumercredit issues: the immunity of the third-party creditor from consumer claims or defenses arising out of failures on the part of the retail merchant.46 Often the credit purchase of goods or services is
financed by an independent creditor rather than by the seller. In
such instances, if the goods prove to be defective or if the merchant
fails to honor his warranty, the customer normally remains obligated
on the debt; the third-party creditor is immune from any claims or
defenses that the customer may have against the merchant. The consumer's frustration at being forced to make payments on defective
goods is not difficult to appreciate.
43. For some guesses as to what some of these concessions might have been, see text
following note 198 infra.
44. For a list of the creditors who supported the WCA, see note 21 supra. Consumer
groups in support of the Act included Wisconsin Consumers' League; Greater Mil•
waukee Consumers' League; U.A.W., Region IO; Wisconsin State AFL-CIO; National
Farmers' Organization; Allied Council of Senior Citizens; Milwaukee County Labor
Council (AFL·CIO); and Madison Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO). Crandall, supra
note 21, at 334-35 n.6.
45. The Act was passed overwhelmingly in the Democrat-controlled Assembly but
was initially defeated in the Republican-controlled Senate. Capital Times (Madison,
Wis.), March 3, 1972, at 36, col. I. The defeat was attributed primarily to the efforts '
of Household Finance Corporation. Id. However, the Senate moved to reconsider the
bill, and, after a few minor changes, it was passed a week later. Id., March 9, 1972,
at I, col. 7.
46. The elimination of this immunity is often referred to as the abolition of the
holder in due course doctrine, but the doctrine is only partly responsible for the im•
munity. See Jordan&: Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM, L. REv.
387, 433-38 (1968); K.ripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented 'Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 445, 469-73 (1968); Littlefield, supra note 6; Murphy, supra
note 4, at 315-20.
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Immunity is achieved in various ways, depending on the type of
transaction involved. If the lender makes a direct loan to the consumer, there is no contractual tie-up to the merchant from whom
the goods are eventually purchased. In the absence of a special
statutory provision immunity is automatic, regardless of the relationship that the lender may have with the merchant.47 Where the loan
is indirect-that is, where the seller initially extends the credit and
then sells the paper to the creditor-immunity may result in one of
two ways. If the customer has signed a negotiable note, the creditor
simply takes the note as a holder in due course. If there is no negotiable note, the customer's contract is assigned to the creditor. The
contract invariably contains a clause wherein the customer waives
all defenses against an assignee. Although their enforceability has
been successfully attacked in a number of states,48 these waiver-ofdefense clauses are usually enforced, and immunity is achieved.49
Basically, the argument for restricting the third-party creditor's
immunity is that the creditor normally has a continuing relationship
with the merchant and, by buying the merchant's paper, is helping
47. Widely variant relationships between merchants and direct lenders abound. For
example, it·is quite common for lender and merchant to enter into a mutually beneficial referral agreement wherein the merchant suggests to the customer that the particular lender would be likely to finance the purchase. The creditor, of course, would
prefer to be the only source of credit suggested. However, it is not uncommon for a
merchant to recommend more than one possible lender. The customer of a highly
reputable merchant will have no trouble obtaining credit, provided the customer is
creditworthy. Hence, unless he receives some kind of a commission, the merchant has
no reason to agree to limit his referrals to one lender. See Kripke, supra note 46, at 471.
On the other hand, even if a customer is a good credit risk, many lenders are leery of
making loans for the purchase of goods from a less reputable merchant, because, even
if there is no legal liability, a dissatisfied customer is troublesome and the lender would
prefer to avoid such problems. Hence, the less reputable merchant is delighted to find
a lender who will accept his referrals, and no further consideration is needed to induce
exclusive referrals.
There exist, of course, many other kinds of creditor-merchant relationships, among
them captive finance companies, familial relationships within lender-merchant management, and interlocking directorships. Moreover, regardless of any such relationship, it
is common practice for the lender to make out the loan check directly to the merchant,
particularly where the lender retains a security interest in the goods purchased.
Classically, the immunity of direct lenders is not affected by the existence of such
relationships, regardless of the intimacy of the relationship. As long as the lender is
not a party to the sale contract, the customer has no claim or defense against him.
Littlefield, supra note 6, at 292-93 n.76.
48. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969);
Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Unico v. Owen,
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 4:05 (1967).
49. The cases in this area are far from unauimous in either theory or result. In
1954, the weight of authority favored immunity. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine oj
Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1096 (1954). At that time Professor Gilmore
saw a trend toward elimination of immunity. However, this trend was not so apparent
to Professor Kripke, writing more recently. See Kripke, supra note 4:6, at 4:69.
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the merchant to stay in business. 50 When the merchant sells defective goods or fails to perform his contractual obligations, the creditor is, in a sense, an accomplice and should share the responsibility.
There was apparently never any question among the first-stage
negotiators of the WCA that the completed bill would provide for
some third-party liability. All parties agreed that consumers had been
unfairly treated in some cases. Moreover, creditors had agreed to
limited liability in the legislative advisory committee negotiations
over the UCCC,51 and the banks did not intend to try to regain what
they had given up there. Indeed, all parties agreed to some extent
that the doctrine's time had run out. The problem was to define mutually satisfactory limits to the newly created liability.
Original AB. 1057 sought to eliminate creditor immunity in consumer transactions through three separate provisions, which (1) prohibited the taking of a negotiable instrument and subjected any
holder of a negotiable instrument to the claims and defenses of the
debtor to the extent of the transaction total; 52 (2) subjected an assignee, any waiver clause notwithstanding, to customer claims and
defenses to the extent of the transaction total; 63 and (3) subjected the
direct lender, to the extent of the amount financed, to all customer
claims and defenses arising out of an "interlocking loan." 64
The banks' position on immunity was complex. Regulation of
the financing of retail purchases necessarily affects the retailer, as
well as the creditor. Often the retailer from whom the bank buys
consumer paper is also the bank's commercial customer. Thus, in
order to maintain amiable relationships in the business community,
the banks were forced to represent the interests of those retail con50. Where the credito.r buys the paper free of consumer defenses, the creditor helps
the disreputable merchant avoid his responsibilities to customers. The nonjudgmentproof customer is forced to pay, and his only recourse as to the merchant is to bring a
civil suit-an alternative that rarely appears inviting to consumers. Clearly, it would
be more difficult for such merchants to stay in business without this assistance, More•
over, this type of financer is justifiably singled out because other types of financing (for
example, inventory or accounts receivable financing, or sale of stock) do not offer this
particular benefit.
51. The advisory committee had adopted alternative A of UCCC section 2,404,
wherein an assignee is subject to customer claims and defenses to the extent of the
amount owing when the claim is raised. However, in addition to the UCCC exception
of agricultural-purpose transactions from operation of the section, the committee had
also excepted motor vehicle purchases. Regarding negotiable instruments, the com•
mittee had adopted UCCC section 2.403, which provides that, except in sales or leases
for agricultural purposes, the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument
other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the consumer.
52. A.B. 1057, § 422.405. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.405.
53. A.B. 1057, § 422.406. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2,406.
54. A.B. 1057, § 422.407. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.407.
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cems that were absent from the negotiations, as well as their own interests.
Initially, the banks thought three changes were essential. First,
the complete nullification of waiver-of-defense clauses in credit sales
was unacceptable.55 The banks were willing, however, to accept a
delay period during which the assignee-creditor would be subject
to customer claims and defenses against the merchant, but after
which waiver clauses would be enforceable. Second, the banks sought
a narrower definition of interlocking loans, especially with regard to
credit card transactions. Third, they sought to decrease the amount
for which a third-party creditor may be liable on an individual
claim.
I. Delay Period on Waiver-of-Defense Clauses
While in some states waiver-of-defense clauses are completely unenforceable in certain kinds of contracts,56 a number of states make
them unenforceable only for a limited time after the customer has
been notified of the assignment of his contract.57 Once the delay
period has passed without the customer having asserted any claim or
defense, the waiver is enforceable, and creditor immunity results.
Original AB. 1057 subjected an assignee to customer claims and
defenses without a time limit; 58 the assignee-creditor's liability was
coextensive with the liability of the merchant. As long as the merchant was legally obligated to the customer, either contractually or
othenvise, the creditor was potentially liable for any failure to perform on the part of the merchant.
The prospect of indefinite potential liability was very trouble55. No Wisconsin creditor was concerned about the prohibition of the use of negotiable instruments in credit sales. While such notes were not completely obsolete in
Wisconsin, no large national or local retailer used them.
56. See, e.g., NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 97.275 (1967) (retail installment sales contracts);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-16-5 (Supp. 1971) (retail installment sales contracts); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, §§ 615(£)-(g) (1947) (retail installment sales of motor vehicles); WASH. R.Ev. CODE
ANN. § 63.14.150 (1968) (retail installment sales contracts).
57. Typically, this delay period is fairly short. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4312
(Supp. 1970) (15-day notification period for all retail sales); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2,
§ 262D (Supp. 1972) (five-day notification period for all installment sales except motor
vehicles); MrCH. COMP. LAws. ANN. § 445.865(d) (1967) (15-day notification period for
all retail installment sales except motor vehicles); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 50-207 to
-208 (Supp. 1972) (15-day notification period for home improvement retail installment
sales); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1402 (Supp. 1972) (45-day notification period for all
retail installment sales except home improvements and motor vehicles); TEX. R.Ev. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.07 to -7.08 (1970) (30-day notification period for all retail
installment sales).
58. A.B. 1057, § 422.406. This provision was identical to NATIONAL CONSUMER Acs:
§ 2.406. The MCCA made no change in this policy. See MoDEL CONSUMER CREDrr Acs:
§§ 2.601-.602.
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some to the banks. Although they admitted that the thirty to fortyfive days usually provided by statute 69 is too short to protect the customer adequately, the banks argued that the economics of financing
credit sales require some cutoff point beyond which the creditor's
potential liability is extinguished. It is a common practice among indirect lenders to hold a portion of the contract price in a reserve account as protection against nonpayment. The size of the account is
normally determined to be a percentage of the total outstanding accounts purchased from the particular dealer. Money is released from
the account to the dealer periodically, depending on the status of the
portfolio. It was argued that the increased potential creditor liability
would require increases in reserves and that the absence of a time
limit on potential liability would make it impossible to determine
how to manage these accounts. The result, it was suggested, would
be increased dealer costs, which would be passed on to the customer.
Consumer representatives were willing to compromise. However,
since the banks were not really arguing their own case,00 the consumer representatives drove a hard bargain. Believing that the vast
majority of legitimate complaints arise within the first year of the
contract, consumer representatives agreed to delay the effectiveness
of waiver-of-defense clauses for nvelve months after notice to the
customer of the assignment.61 They insisted, however, that the delay
period be so terminated only if the assignee is not "related to" 62 the
59. See note 57 supra.
60. It was clear that the banks could protect themselves through holdback accounts
and recourse agreements. Generally, throughout the negotiations, consumer representa•
tives were not very receptive to arguments made by proxy. Hence, since the primary
bank concern was protection of the retailer's interest, bank representatives were at
something of a disadvantage.
In addition, the validity of the creditors' argument is questionable, If the merchant
is highly reputable, the number of valid claims wherein the merchant refuses to satls(y
the customer will be minute, and the impact of liability on the lender will be corre•
spondingly light. See Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uni•
form Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209, 1215-16 (1950),
Moreover, the release of funds from a holdback account is actually a matter of
estimating the probability that an unsatisfied valid claim will arise, Certainly there
is a point at which this probability with respect to an individual account is sufficiently
low to permit release of the reserve (for example, when any express warranty runs out),
Granted, the certainty of a statutory time limit is lacking. But where the creditor
carries hundreds (or thousands) of accounts with a merchant, the occasional late-arising
claim is not likely to have a serious economic impact. In my opinion, the banks, rather
than seeking relief from a severe problem, simply sought the peace of mind that comes
of certainty.
61. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422,407 (2),
62. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 421.301(32)-(33) define "person related to" as follows:
(32) "Person related to" with respect to a natural person means:
(a) The spouse of the natural person;
(b) A brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law of the natural person;
(c) An ancestor or lineal descendent of the natural person or his spouse; and
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assignor and the assignee acquires the contract in good faith and for
value.63 For the purposes of this section an extremely stringent definition of good faith, which conceivably could require that the creditor be certain of the merchant's good repute if he is to rely on a
waiver clause, was included.64 Moreover, while the creditor will not
be subject to the debtor's claim unless he receives notice of it within
the twelve-month period, the WCA contains no restrictions as to
what types of notice will be effective.65 Presumably, any notice of the
customer's claim, regardless of its source or form, ,\Till be effective
against the creditor if received in time. This could include information received from the merchant, other customers, newspapers, or
perhaps even the grapevine. It remains for litigation to establish any
limits.
With regard to the immunity of the third-party creditor the
UCCC provides two alternatives.66 Alternative A invalidates waiverof-defense clauses entirely, while Alternative B provides for a threemonth delay period. Hence, the DCCC essentially takes no position
on this issue. The UCCC Redraft, however, discards Alternative B.67
Similarly, the National Commission on Consumer Finance recommends indeterminate 'lender responsibility. Stating that most delaying statutes provide an "unrealistically short" period within which
to assert a defense, the Commission concludes that they afford the
consumer "no real protection."68
(d) Any other relative, by blood or marriage, of the natural person or his
spouse who shares the same home with the natural person.
(33) "Person related to" with respect to an organization means:
(a) A person directly or indirectly controlling the organization, controlled by
the organization or, who together with the organization, is under common control;
(b} An officer or director of the organization or a person performing similar
functions with respect to the organization or to a person related to the organization;
(c) The spouse of a natural person related to the organization; and
(d) A relative by blood or marriage of a person related to the organization who
shares the same home with him.
Section 421.301(31) defines "person" to include both natural persons and organizations.
A very similar definition of "person related to" is found in MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT
Acr § 1.433.
63. Wisconsin Consumer Act§ 422.407(2).
64. The assignee does not acquire the contract in good faith if he has knowledge or
written notice of violations of the Act, unconscionable conduct by the assignor, or
substantial complaints against the assignor involving such contracts. Wisconsin Consumer Act§ 422.407(3).
65. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.407(2) simply states that a waiver-of-defense
clause is enforceable only by an assignee who "has not received notice of the customer's
claim or defense" within 12 months of giving notice of the assignment to the customer.
66. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404.
67. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 3.404 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972).
68. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 35. See also Jordan & Warren, supra note
46, at 434-!15 (discussing the New York ten-day delay statute).
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Since rp.ost defects in consumer goods should become apparent
within a year, it cannot be said that the WCA offers "no real protection." On the other hand, the benefit of the clause to the creditor
after the delay period seems only marginal.69 In that light it seems
harsh to leave the rare customer whose claim arises after the delay
period without recourse.
2. Interlocking Loans

The primary objective of interlocking loan provisions is to prevent creditors from avoiding the restriction of creditor immunity in
credit sales simply by changing the form of the transaction. For example, in the normal third-party-financed credit sale, the merchant
"supplies" the financing and then immediately sells the paper or assigns the contract to the creditor. Under the WCA, the creditor
would be subject to the claims of the customer against the merchant
for at least twelve months after notice of the assignment. On the
other hand, if the customer had obtained a direct loan from the
same creditor and used the proceeds to purchase goods from the merchant, the WCA would not subject the creditor to customer claims
against the merchant. Given this dichotomy, it would seem simple
enough for the lender to retain his immunity by extending the credit
directly to the customer. Presumably, the creditor could accomplish
this merely by supplying the merchant with the proper forms. 70 But
such meaningless changes of form should not allow the creditor to
escape the operation of the statute.
On the other hand, in some circumstances the direct lender has
no tie to the merchant, and it cannot be said that he has simply made
the same loan directly that he would have made indirectly. In such a
case, there is no justification for saddling the creditor with responsibility resulting from the consumer's choice of merchants.71 The
concept of the interlocking loan is intended to draw the line between those direct lenders who should sh3ire the responsibility for
merchant failures and those who should not.
Draftsmen of consumer-credit legislation now generally seem to
agree that the direct lender should bear some responsibility when
69. See note 60 supra.
70. Quite often the indirect lender approves the loan before the merchant closes
the deal. The actual assignment of the contract is merely a formality, and the distinc•
tion between direct and indirect lending is meaningless.
71. The MCCA would impose liability in many cases in which the lender has neither
this connection with the merchant nor knowledge of which merchant the consumer will
patronize. See note 74 infra. However, this view has not received general support.
See Kripke, supra note 46, at 470-71 n.66; Littlefield, supra note 6, at 292-93 n.76,
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the loan is closely related to the sale. While the UCCC is silent
on this point, the UCCC Redraft adds provisions imposing such
responsibility.72 Similarly, the National Commission recommends
lender liability in "connected Ioans."73
Original A.B. 1057 defined interlocking loans as those wherein
the lender "participated in or was connected with the consumer
transaction" in which the proceeds of the loan were used. 74 The definition of "participated or connected"75 included, but was not limited
to, all credit card transactions,76 loans wherein the seller referred the
customer to the creditor,77 and the circumstance where "[t]he creditor makes 20 or more loans in any calendar year, the proceeds of
which are used in transactions with the same seller ...." 78 Not only
would a vast number of loans interlock under these provisions,79 but
the open-ended definition of "participated or connected" would also
make it impossible to evaluate prospectively whether a loan would
interlock.80 This vagueness was anathema to creditors. Arguing that
72. A lender who makes a consumer loan to enable the borrower to purchase or
lease goods or services from a particular merchant may be subject to the consumer's
claims or defenses against the merchant if
(a) the lender knows that the seller or lessor arranged, for a ••. fee, for the extension of credit by the lender; (b) the lender is a person related to the seller or
lessor unless the relationship is remote or is not a factor in the transaction; (c)
the seller or lessor guarantees the loan or otherwise assumes the risk of loss by the
lender upon the loan; (d) the lender directly supplies the seller or lessor with
the contract document used by the consumer to evidence the loan, and the seller
or lessor significantly participates in the preparation of the document; or (e) the
loan is conditioned upon the consumer's purchase or lease of the goods or services
from the particular seller or lender, but the lender's payment of proceeds of the
loan to the seller or lessor does not in itself establish that the loan was [s]o
conditioned.
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 3.405 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972).
73. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 37-38.
74. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(1). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(1).
The MCCA changes this formulation. It makes the direct lender subject to consumer claims and defenses unless he can show that he had no reason to know that
the proceeds of tl1e loan would be used in a consumer transaction. MODEL CONSUMER
CREDIT Acr § 2.603(3). While perhaps less vague, this provision is at least as broad as its
NCA counterpart.
75. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2). This provision is very similar to NCA section 2.407(2);
however, the Wisconsin bill included one additional type of participation-when "[t]he
creditor knows that the seller arranged the extension of credit by the creditor." A.B.
1057, § 422.407(2)(c).
76. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(h). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(2)(g).
77. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(£). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(2)(e).
78. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(e). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(d).
79. The coincidence of a large-volume automobile or appliance dealer and a large
lender in the same geographic area would undoubtedly result in satisfaction of the
"20 or more loans" requirement in a very short time. In addition, the very common
practice of referring a customer to a creditor would presumably result in interlock
even though the referral may not have been exclusive and even though there may
have been no referral agreement.
80. Arguably, any time the proceeds of a loan are used to purchase goods, the
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such a broad definition of interlocking loans would severely restrict
the availability of direct credit, bank representatives quickly convinced consumer representatives that these provisions operated far
beyond their intended sphere. They suggested that it made more
sense to define interlocking loans in terms of a finite number of specific activities and relationships. To that end, the section was entirely redrafted.
It was agreed, fairly uneventfully, that a lender must know or
have reason to know that the "proceeds of the loan are used to pay
all or a part of the customer's obligation to the [merchant] ..." if
a loan is to interlock. 81 Once this precondition is met, there are six
circumstances, any of which gives rise to an interlocking loan under
theWCA.
There was substantial agreement on the first four circumstances:
(1) where the lender is "related to" the seller,82 (2) where the lender
supplies the loan forms to the seller,83 (3) where the lender pays a
commission to the seller,84 and (4) where the lender has a recourse or
guarantee arrangement ·with the seller. 85 These four circumstances
substantially coincide with provisions of the UCCC Redraft80 and
the Commission Report. 87 There is no such general agreement among
the proposed consumer-credit legislation on the last two interlocking
relationships enumerated in the WCA-credit-card sales and consumer-credit transactions with known disreputable merchants.
Intensive negotiations were necessary to determine the extent to
which credit-card transactions would be subject to the interlocking
loan provisions. As mentioned above, Original AB. 1057 included
creditor has "participated in" or was "connected with" the sale. Presumably, the NCA
draftsmen did not intend the application of section 2.407 to go this far, but it would
be impossible to predict where its application might stop short of this.
The MCCA draws this line more dearly. The lender is subject to consumer defenses
unless he can show that he had no reason to believe that the loaned funds would be
used in a consumer transaction, MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(3).
81. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3).
82. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(a). The definition of "related to" is set out
in note 62 supra.
83. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(b).
84. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(c).
85. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(d).
86. Uniform Consumer Credit Code §§ 3.405(l)(a)-(d) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972).
87. COMMISSION RE!>ORT, supra note 23, at 37-38. Oddly, the Commission Report docs
not include the fourth factor (recourse agreement) among those to be considered in
evaluating closeness, even though an express agreement between merchant and creditor
would be required. However, where such an agreement exists, the parties will probably
fall within the Commission's sixth factor-repeated and regular loans resulting from
merchant referrals. Id. at 38.
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all credit-card purchases within this definition.88 This ·was totally
unacceptable to the banks, which believed that an insurmountable
accounting problem would be created if the majority of charge-card
puchases were not exempted from the interlocking loan provisions:
That is, if the customer could raise complaints as to small purchases
-even if only a few customers exercised this option-it would take
a tremendous amount of manpower to track down the individual
transactions and charge them back to the merchant. To a business
whose profitability depends on the minimization of human processing time, this was a horrifying prospect. Consumer representatives,
however, were not willing simply to exclude credit cards from the
interlocking loan provisions. Banks that issue credit cards are certainly closely related to the merchants who honor their cards.89 The
fact that credit is extended through the device of a credit card, rather
than through a loan, does not alter the rationale for imposing creditor responsibility. The banks, however, were able to convince the
consumer representatives that, to a certain extent, credit cards are
not truly a credit device but are merely a substitute for cash. That
is, but for the card, the consumer would use cash to make smaller
purchases rather than borrow money. Consumer representatives
agreed that, in so far as the card is a cash substitute, the creditor is
not really helping to keep the merchant in business and should not
be subject to the customer's claims against the merchant. Lacking
any empirical guidelines, the negotiators settled somewhat arbitrarily on one hundred dollars as the point at which a credit-card purchase becomes a loan rather than a mere expenditure of plastic
money. Hence, the fifth circumstance in which interlock is found
under the WCA is a credit-card purchase in excess of one hundred
dollars. 90 On such purchases the bank is subject to customer defenses
against the merchant; for smaller charges, the customer cannot use
such defenses.91
88. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(11). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(2)(g).
The MCCA makes no change in this policy. Although there is no explicit reference
to credit-card transactions, they are undoubtedly covered by the broad MCCA language.
See MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr §§ 2.603(3)-(4). Certainly, the bank knows that the
customer will use the credit card in consumer transactions. See note 74 supra.
89. Typically, the bank and the merchant enter into a complex agreement that gives
the bank the right to charge back to the merchant any purchase for which the customer
refuses to pay and calls for the merchant to pay a percentage of the purchase price to
the bank. See, e.g., New England Bankcard Assn., Operating Rules, arts. 7, 9.
90. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(£). Of course, it was also necessary to
except credit cards from the S!!ction creating interlock where there exists a recourse or
guarantee agreement with the merchant. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(d).
91. The section is worded in terms _of loans in excess of one hundred dollars. Presumably, this refers to each discrete transaction. Hence, if a number of items are pur-
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In retrospect, all negotiators seemed quite content with this result. The banks succeeded in escaping responsibility for merchant
failures in the great majority of credit-card purchases. Further, the
banks can protect themselves against the failures of a specific merchant by establishing a limit of one hundred dollars for purchases
from that merchant. Consumer representatives never considered this
an area of particular abuse, since the bank credit card is primarily a
middle class device; yet, the bank is subject to consumer claims and
defenses in the case of large purchases, where the greatest possibility
of abuse lies.
The Commission Report recommends the same approach. However, it suggests a purchase price of fifty dollars as the point below
which a credit-card purchase does not interlock.92 Of course, a fiftydollar cutoff point is as arbitrary as one of one hundred dollars. If
the policy behind the limitation is that at some point credit cards are
cash substitutes rather than credit devices, then the true cutoff point
would depend on the buying habits of the individual customer. I
therefore submit that the talk about "cash substitutes" simply provides a convenient rationale for performing a very practical tasksetting a cutoff point high enough that the bank's clerical operations
are not severely encumbered, yet low enough to minimize the likelihood of abuse.
The U CCC Redraft also provides for a fifty-dollar purchase price
minimum before subjecting the issuer of a bank credit card to the
claims and defenses that the cardholder has against the merchant. 93
However, it adds a second limitation-that the lender is not so subject unless the cardholder's residence and the place where the purchase was made are within the same state or within one hundred
miles of each other. Apparently this limitation is based on the presumption that the lender is unlikely to have a significant connection
with a more distant merchant. By comparison, the WCA provision
applies only to credit-card purchases made within Wisconsin but
contains no such distance limitation.04 Also, the UCCC Redraft adds
the limitation that the cardholder may assert his claim or defense
chased at one time for a total exceeding 100 dollars, the transaction would interlock.
The fact that more than one voucher may have been filled out should be irrelevant.
However, this could yield the odd result that the purchase of a 25-dollar appliance
interlocks because other goods were purchased at the same time. Of course, if the
appliance turns out to be defective, the customer would have a defense only to the
extent of 25 dollars. See note llO infra and accompanying text.
92. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 38.
93. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.403(2) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972).
94. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(f).
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against the lender only after having attempted, in good faith, to obtain satisfaction from the merchant. 915
The objective of the definition of interlocking loans, in so far as
the five circumstances discussed above are concerned, is to delineate
those situations in which the creditor and the merchant are so closely
related that the creditor should not be allowed to escape responsibility for the merchant's conduct. There is, however, a second, and
much more controversial, objective of the WCA interlocking loan
provisions-to force the credit community to police retail merchants.
Basically, the rationale is: Some policing is needed, neither the state
nor the merchant community has performed the task satisfactorily,
the creditor is better able to assume the function than the borrower,
and the result of forcing creditors to police merchants will be a
more equitable distribution of the costs of policing throughout the
community.96 In theory, if the creditor is saddled with responsibility
for merchant failures, creditors will refrain from financing purchases
from the less reputable merchants in the community.97 Creditors, of
course, do not feel that this burden should be theirs.
In order to coerce creditor policing the definition of interlocking
loans must be broad. If a loan interlocks only where the creditor and
merchant have a manifest working agreement, no significant policing
will result, for creditors will surely refrain from entering into such
agreements with disreputable merchants. As long as the danger of
interlocking is so easily avoided, there will be no impetus to refuse
a loan to a customer who intends to apply the proceeds to the purchase of goods or services from such a merchant.
Original AB. 1057 contained no specific provision aimed to this
end; however, its definition of interlock98 was so pervasive that no
specifically directed provision was needed. 99 When the section was
95. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.403(3)(a) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972).
Certainly tbis makes good sense, but tbe provision's impact is likely to be minimal.
The vast majority of customers will probably look first to tbe merchant as a matter
of common sense. Moreover, since tbe banks are concerned about maintaining affable
relationships with customers, they are not likely to ignore a complaint simply because
tbe customer brought it to tbe bank first. Ratber, tbe Qank. is more likely to contact
tbe merchant and to act as a mediator in tbe dispute.
96. This view is not unique. For a tborough discussion of tbe competing policies
and tbe suggestion that tbe UCCC deal witb tbis problem, see Littlefield, supra note 6,
at 280-97.
97. By "less reputable" or "disreputable" merchants, I mean merchants who, witb
some regnlarity, fail to perform tbeir agreements witb customers or who fail to remedj
valid complaints.
98. See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
99. Surely tbis result was intended by tbe draftsmen of tbe NCA. See NATIONAL
CoNSUMER Acr § 2.407, Comment 2.
The MCCA goes still furtber. The nonexclusive list of circumstances for which a
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redrafted to define interlocking loans in terms of specific, identifiable
relationships, consumer representatives insisted that a section coercing creditor policing be included. They would have liked every loan
that found its way into the hands of a disreputable mechant to interlock. Banks insisted that, at most, a loan should interlock only if it
is made by a creditor who knows that the merchant is disreputable.
The issue for negotiation was thus narrowed to what kinds of lender
knowledge of merchant repute would give rise to interlock. The
final formulation includes "knowledge from [the lender's] course of
dealing with other customers of the [merchant] or from the lender's
records, or written notice of substantial complaints by such other
customers, that [the merchant] fails or refuses to perform his contracts with them and ... fails to remedy such complaints within a
reasonable time."100 Bank representatives now fear that this provision will have a more pervasive impact than they initially intended. Consumer representatives, content with this result, suggest
that knowledge of a merchant derived from other customers could
reasonably include grapevine information and that ·written notice
should include such sources as newspaper and better business bureau
reports. It remains for the courts to establish the ultimate reach of
the provision.
Neither the UCCC nor the UCCC Redraft contains a knowledgeof-disreputable-merchant provision. Apparently, the UCCC Special
Committee agrees with creditors that the burden of policing retail
merchants belongs elsew4ere. The National Commission, however,
includes among the factors and incidents that it considers relevant
to a determination of close connection, a provision nearly identical
to that of the WCA.101
The first-stage redrafting of the interlocking loan provisions was
nearly totally acceptable to all creditors participating in the secondstage negotiations. However, the consumer finance company representatives did insist on one change: A prerequisite that "all or a
meaningful part" of the proceeds of the loan be used in the purchase102 was added to the definition of interlocking loans. Consumer
lender will be "deemed to have knowledge" that the loan proceeds will be used in a
consumer transaction is even more extensive than the NCA list of circumstances giving
rise to participation or connection. Compare MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(4)
with NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.407(2).
100. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(e).
101. CoMMISSION R.EPoRT, supra note 23, at 38. The Commission's terminology is
somewhat illogical, since a creditor's knowledge of a merchant's reputation hardly
establishes a close connection.
102. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3).
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finance companies often make multipurpose loans. the proceeds of
which might be used to consolidate existing loans or to purchase
goods from more than one merchant. They argued that it was anomalous that an entire loan should interlock where only a small portion
of its proceeds were applied to purchases from the merchant with
whom the lender is said to have an interlocking relationship.103
3. The Financial Liability Limit

The final bank objective concerning the liability of third-party
creditors was to reduce the extent to which a creditor might be liable
on an individual claim. Original A.B. 1057 provided for creditor
liability up to the amount of the total transaction in credit sales and
up to the amount financed in the case of interlocking loans.104 The
banks believed that since the creditor is not directly responsible for
the merchant's failure, its liability should not in any event exceed
the amount due on the obligation at the time the defense is raised.
As suggested above,105 the Wisconsin consumer representatives
felt that creditors kept many merchants in business by :financing
their sales,100 whether by purchasing the merchants' paper or by
making interlocking loans.107 They felt that creditor liability should
103. But note, where only a portion of an interlocking loan is used in the purchase
on which the customer's claim is based, lender liability is limited to that amount. See
note 110 infra. Why, then, should a small loan that would otherwise interlock not do
so simply because it was not "a meaningful part" of a large multipurpose loan?
104. A.B. 1057, § 422.406 (credit sales). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.406. A.B.
1057, § 422.407(1) (connected loans). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.407(1).
The MCCA extends the potential liability of the creditor beyond the transaction
total. Credit-sale financers and lenders are both subject to all of the claims and defenses
of the consumer arising out of the transaction financed. MoDEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r
§§ 2.602(2) (credit sales), 2.603(2) (loans). The creditor can limit his potential liability
if he acquires the obligation of the consumer "in good faith, for value, without notice
of any claims, defenses or equities and continues to act in good faith" thereafter.
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(2) (lenders). See also MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Am:
§ 2.602(2) (credit sales). If these requirements are met the liability of a sales financer is
limited to the transaction total, MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.602(2), and that of a
lender is limited to the amount of the loan plus the finance charges. MODEL CONSUMER
CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(2). However, for the purposes of these provisions, a creditor is not
in good faith if, having reason to know of a claim, he attempts to collect the obligation.
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 2.601(3)(a).
105. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
106. While there are, of rourse, many substantial retailers who carry their own
credit, or at least a great deal of it, most merchants depend heavily on the availability
of outside financing. The Wisconsin consumer representatives believed that much of
the ronsumer abuse occurs at the hands of insubstantial, inefficient, and often undercapitalized Jllerchants who, but for creditor support, would not be in business.
107. While the interlocking lender does not supply the merchant's working capital
as clearly as does the purchaser of the merchant's paper, the circumstances giving rise
to interlock certainly call for some creditor responsibility. The NCA and A.B. 1057
dichotomy in potential liability between "transaction total" in sales and "amount
financed" on loans is apparently based on the presumption that the interlocking lender
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extend to the amount of the entire transaction. Consumer representatives realized, however, that primary responsibility should lie
with the merchant. Hence, their objectives concerning creditor
responsibility were twofold: First, where a valid consumer claim or
defense arises, the consumer should be able to stop making payments
and set off the value of any claim against the amount due; and,
second, if the consumer has a claim in excess of the amount due and
is unable to obtain redress against the merchant (for example, where
" the merchant is insolvent or unavailable), the customer should be
able to look to the creditor.
Once the objectives of the consumer representatives were clear,
the negotiators were able to arrive at a mutually satisfactory compromise. They devised the following two-stage formula: First, the
creditor is subject to customer claims and defenses to the extent of
the amount owed at the time the defense is raised. Second, if judgment against the merchant has been ~btained and execution returned unsatisfied,108 the creditor is additionally liable up to the total
amount financed (including finance charges). On the theory that the
creditor is actually involved in the transaction only to the extent of
the amount financed, the customer may look solely to the merchant
for his down payment. This formula applies to both credit sales100
and interlocking loans.110
In sharp contrast to the WCA, the unwavering position of the
UCCC Special Committee is that creditor liability should never extend beyond the amount due at the time that notice of the claim is
received111 The National Commission, on the other hand, recomis somehow not as deeply involved in the transaction; that is, the interlocking lender is
involved only to the extent of the amount of the loan, whereas the credit-sales financer
is more like the merchant's partner. To the extent that the financing is essential to
the merchant's operation, the distinction seems specious-a c~nclusion that the Wisconsin negotiators reached without difficulty.
108. Until this event has occurred, except where the merchant is in bankruptcy,
receivership, or other insolvency proceedings, the debtor may assert any claims against
the creditor only by way of counterclaim, defense to or set-off against claims brought
by the creditor. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.407(5). This protects the creditor against
being automatically joined in every action against the merchant; where the merchant
is solvent, the creditor retains the prerogative to avoid involvement. Since the normal
credit-sale financer is bound by the litigation, see note 114 and text accompanying
notes 113-14 infra, the customer is not prejudiced by his inability to join the creditor.
The provision was added late in the negotiations, chiefly at the insistence of the
consumer finance companies.
109. See Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 422.406(4) (regarding holders of negotiable
instruments), 422.407(2) (regarding assignees of consumer contracts).
110. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(4). Of course, this liability is limited to the
portion of the loan used in the purchase on which the claim is based.
111. UNIFORM C0Nsu111ER CREorr CODE §§ 2.404A, .404B. The UCCC Redraft suggests
no change in this policy. UNIFORM CONSUl\lER CREDrr CODE §§ 8.403(3)(b), .404(2), .405(2)
(Working Redraft No. 4, 1972).
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mends substantially the same outside limits on creditor liability as.
those adopted by the WCA, 112 but does not recommend that the
customer be required to look first to the merchant for recovery of
any claim in excess of the amount due on the account. I submit that,
although it is more complex, the Wisconsin approach is preferable
to those of the UCCC and the National Commission. Since the
amount that is due when the claim is raised depends entirely on the
time that the merchant's failure becomes apparent, the UCCC
approach seems quite arbitrary. If the creditor is to be subject to
customer claims against the merchant, I see no reason why his
liability should be less if a defect in the goods or services appears six
months after the sale than if the defect appears immediately. Also,
where the customer's claim exceeds the amount due, requiring the
customer to obtain judgment against the merchant is preferable for
two reasons. First, it ensures that the party truly responsible for the
claim will pay if possible. Creditor liability will exceed the amount
due on the account only in the unusual case where execution against
the merchant is returned unsatisfied. Second, it reduces the cost to
the creditor that would arise if he were unnecessarily joined in customer-merchant litigation.
At first blush, these requirements seem to be an added burden for
the consumer. However, the burden has been minimized in the
WCA. If judgment against the merchant is obtained by default, the
customer will not have been put to a great deal of trouble. If, in the
case of credit sales, the issue of the merchant's failure to perform
has been litigated the creditor is bound by the judgment.113 The
situation is somewhat different in the case of interlocking loans, since
the lender is not bound by any judgment that the customer may obtain against the merchant. 114 However, once the customer establishes
that the loan interlocks, the creditor is likely to concede the issue of
112. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 35-36. The Commission recommends that
under negotiable instruments and contracts, liability should not exceed the original
amount financed, whereas in the case of loans, liability should not exceed the lesser
of the amount financed or the amount of the purchase made with the loan proceeds.
Although not entirely clear, the "amount financed" presumably does not include
finance charges.
113. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 422.406(4)(b), .407(2)(b).
114. There is a sensible explanation for this different treatment of sales and loans.
Presuming merchant liability, there is never any question as to the creditor's secondary
liability in the case of sales. In the case of loans, however, the customer must first
establish the existence of an interlocking loan as a condition precedent to lender
liability. Hence, in the case of sales the creditor has clear impetus and opportunity
to aid the merchant in his defense. The direct lender, on the other hand, might
reasonably believe himself immune and thus ignore the merchant's handling of the
case. If e.xecution is then returned unsatisfied and the customer can establish interlock,
the lender should have the opportunity to relitigate the issue of the merchant's
liability.
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the merchant's liability. Even if the interlocking lender chooses to
relitigate this issue, the customer is unlikely to be severely prejudiced
since the WCA provides that the prevailing customer be awarded
attorney's fees.115

Delays in the Enforcement of Creditor Remedies: Default,
Unilateral Deferral, Cure of Default, and Repossession
The UCCC does not upset the common law policy that the definition of default be left a matter of contract between the parties.
Many consumer advocates see this continuation of common law
policy as one of the UCCC's major failings. 116 In the consumer
setting, the common law presumption of bargaining between the
parties is a myth.117 The definition of default, as well as nearly all
other contract provisions, is in the hands of the creditor. Unsurprisingly, some of the events of default found in consumer contracts
bear only scant relation to the likelihood that the creditor will be
paid.118 For example, payment of an installment even one day late is
invariably a default. Further, the contract usually contains an acceleration clause that gives the creditor the option, on default, of
declaring the entire balance of the obligation immediately due and
payable.119 Of course, where the debt is secured, default gives rise to
the creditor's Uniform Commercial Code rights to repossess and
dispose of collateral.120
B.

115. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.308.
116. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.103, Comment 1; Clark, supra note 14, at 308,
117. See Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMP, L.Q. 125
(1962).
118. For example, the pre-WCA motor vehicle security agreement form approved
by the Wisconsin Banker's Association and the Wisconsin Installment Banker's Asso•
ciation included the following among the events of default: death of the debtor or
surety, failure to perform any obligation under the agreement, and "any other event
which causes Secured Party, in good faith, to deem itself insecure." Regarding the
likelihood of being paid, the death of a surety could certainly be meaningless, and
relevance of the death of the debtor depends on the condition of his estate, Moreover,
many of the debtor's obligations under the agreement, if not performed, might well
bear no relation to the creditor's likelihood of receiving payment. For example, the
debtor is obligated not to permit the value of the collateral to be impaired, regardless
of the size of the impairment or the amount due on the obligation. Surely, a 200-dollar
dent in the fender of a 3,000-dollar car is irrelevant to the bank if the outstanding
balance is 1,000 dollars. Finally, the creditor could in good faith deem itself insecure
on the basis of an erroneous tip that the debtor is about to abscond.
To be sure, all the events of default defined in this security agreement could be
relevant to the creditor's likelihood of being paid. However, nothing in the security
agreement guarantees it.
119. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURin' INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1195 (1965): "For a
hundred years, it may be, no security agreement has failed to include an acceleration
clause." See also J. WHI1E & R. 5UMJIIERS, HANDBOOK OF nu: I.Aw UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-3, at 958 (1972).
120. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE §§ 9-501, -503 to -504.
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Although the Wisconsip. consumer represt'!ntatives recogp.iied
that creditors rarely ta.ke advantage of these defa,ult provisions, they
felt that the common la.w policy gives creditqrs the powt'!r t9 discrhninate in the individual case. A.1.tJ:wttgh sµch power might be
justifiable in the commerdal setting, where it has been J:>argained
qD.d paid for, the cqrn,umer representatives felt it ,has no legitimate
place in the consumer-credit wqrld. They believed that no creditor
should be allowed to take affirmative action against a consumer
unless the contTIJ.ct })reach has a material jmpact on t4G creditor's
likelihood of receiving payment and that mere delinquency on a
single installment has p.q such iJllpact.121 They further believed that
even where a debtor l}as committed a material breach he shoulcl be
given a reasonable opportunity to reinstate the contract. Thus, in
Original AB. 1057 they severely restricted the definition of defaµh
and further regulated the circm:p.stances under whic;h. the cre.ditor
could accelerate the obligation <;>r take any other action..
The negotiations concerning these provisiop.s were e~trem.ely
arduous. Though all creditor groups were concerned, sp!ij.e were
much more intensely concerned than others. lV[ap.y crf!dit<;>r§ rarely
resort to repossession; they rely on §C;?<;urity interests, if ~t g}J, as a
p~ychological tool to help iJ!q.u~e payment. Therl;!fore, they were
willip.g to accept any scht'!me that would not severely disrupt their
normal collection activitje§, H<;>wever, :rp.any other creditors, chiefly
automobile financers, rely heavily on colJ~tt'!ral jn extending cr!;!dit.
Repossession and disposal of collateral is an e§sential part of their
business operation. Any delay in the accrual of their right to repossess or dispose of collateral may result in losses.122 Since the
potential impact of these restricti<:ms OJ! th.eir interests was considerable, their negotiating :position w~ intractable.
1. Default and Unilateral Deferral

Original A..B, 1057 defined d!;!fault as (4) failure to pay three
successive installments when due, (b) failure to pay the balance due
12J, See Crandall, supra note 21, ;it 357-58. Crf!Ild;tll, t:4e Jcey Wisi;opsiµ c;:qnsum\!r
negotiator, emphasize& the need to reinstate tl!e doctrine oi IIJatep;il preach jµ con~umer rontracts and t]lat at common I.aw misi;ed paYIJlents alo11.e were not considered
material enough to justify acceleration of the entire obligation.
122. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Reposse&sion: An Economic Analysis, in Brief for
the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code as Amicus Curiae,
app. A., at 26-34, Adams y. Southern Cal. First Natl, Bank, 42 U.S,L.W. 2~30 (9th Cir.,
Oct, 4, 1973), A version of Professor Johnson's paper can be found in 47 S. CAL. L.
REv. 82 (1973).
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within three months of the date for final payment, or (c) delinquency
on installments totaling thirty per cent of the amount financed. 128
It also provided that if the customer were ten days delinquent on any
installment, he had the unlimited right to (I) defer the payment, (2)
refinance the unpaid balance, or (3) consolidate the unpaid balance
with that of another transaction.124 Since the effect of each provision
is to delay accrual of the creditor's right to take action against the
debtor, the definition of default and the unilateral deferral-refinanceconsolidation right became a single package in negotiations.
At first-stage negotiations, bank representatives were initially
concerned that default was defined only in terms of nonpayment. 126
They argued that credit is often extended in genuine reliance on
collateral and that in such cases, if the actions of the debtor
jeopardize the value of the collateral or the creditor's ability to
realize on it, the creditor ought to be able to protect his interest. The
banks did not have much difficulty convincing consumer representatives that if the vendor were powerless to protect his security
interest, collateral-based credit would be severely restricted and
low-income consumers would find it difficult to buy cars. Hence,
consumer representatives agreed to include in the definition of default the customer's failure to observe a covenant in the contract,
"breach of which materially impairs the condition, value or protection of or the creditor's right in" the collateral.126 On the theory that
the unsecured creditor needs similar protection, a breach that "materially impairs the customer's ability to pay" was also included. 127
123. A.B. 1057, § 425.103(1). See NATIONAL CoNsUMER Ac:r § 5.103(1). The "amount
financed" docs not include the finance charge. A.B. 1057, § 421.301(5); NATIONAL
CoNsu11mR Ac:r § 1.301(5). The MCCA discards this formula. The primary thrust of its
approach is that the debtor is in default when he is delinquent on installments amounting to more than fifteen per cent of the transaction total. See MoDEL CONSUMER CREDIT
Ac:r § 7.102. There is no provision for default arising from debtor conduct other than
nonpayment.
124. A.B. 1057, § 422.203(1). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2,203(1).
125. For reasons unclear to me, draftsmen of the NCA considered this a fundamental principle. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.203, Comment 1.
126. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.103(2)(c).
127. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.103(2)(c). This phrase came in on the heels of
the collateral-jeopardy provision. Consequently, and unfortunately, it did not receive
much attention. The result is far too broad a grant of power to the creditor, power
the creditor docs not need. To be sure, there are circu10Stances in which the unsecured
creditor needs to act quickly to protect his interests, such as when the debtor makes a
fraudulent conveyance or begins to move his personalty out of the state. Indeed, these
are the sort of circu10Stances that the WCA draftsmen had in mind. But the broad
material-impairment-of-ability-to-pay provision extends far beyond such extreme circu10Stances. Presumably, events such as loss of job, illness, and divorce can amount to a
default under this provision-even before the debtor's next payment is due. Con•
ceivably, the creditor whose forms contain the right debtor covenants will hold the
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Creditor representatives at the second stage had no objections, and
the section was adopted as revised.
The definition of default• as three successive installments outstanding was totally unacceptable to all creditors, so it was discussed
early in the first stage of negotiations. The possibility that a debtor
could, without default, miss two installments, pay one, and then miss
two more was mind-boggling. Although creditor representatives were
willing to agree that default based on a one-day delinquency may be
too severe, they were quite concerned about the potential losses that
result from any significant delay in the accrual of repossession rights.
Therefore, they argued that default should occur within a reasonably short time after a payment is missed.
Consumer representatives never truly expected the original definition to remain. Yet they staunchly opposed the accrual of creditor
remedies as a result of a single late payment.128 They were willing
to discuss such a definition of default, however, since under Original
A.B. 1057, the debtor who was having difficulty meeting his payment
schedule could elect to modify the contract terms.129 The creditors,
of course, were hardly pleased with the prospect of unilateral modification.
It took creditor representatives little time to convince consumer
representatives that unilateral refinance and consolidation were
simply unworkable. The exercise of such rights would have req_uired
the complete rewriting of the contract with new terms, payment
schedules, and other arrangements, which would simply not be possame power he once held under the now infamous insecurity clause. Surely, such
creditor latitude is unjustifiable. Any impaired-ability-to-pay test should be limited to
those cases where the creditor has a legitimate need to act quickly to protect his
interests. Otherwise, where collateral is not jeopardized, the creditor should be required
to wait until a default in payment has occurred.
Of course, this result could be achieved through a very strict construction of "material impairment," either by administrative rule or by the Wisconsin courts. It is to be
hoped that such a construction will be adopted.
128. The materiality of a single delinquent payment is not susceptible to easy
analysis-especially in a vacuum. The true significance of a delinquency is not the
injury to the creditor. Rather, a delinquency is significant because it is an indication
that later payments might not be made. If a customer has consistently paid prior installments within ten days of the date due, a five-day delinquency indicates nothing.
On the other hand, if a debtor has a poor payment record and if his contract has just
been renegotiated, a five-day delinquency might be a strong indication that more
trouble is in the offing. To repossess the first debtor's car after a five-day delinquency
hardly seems justifiable. In the second instance, however, the equities seem to have
changed-the delinquency seems more material. In both cases, we know more than
the mere fact that there was a single delinquency. The surrounding facts were critical
to the evaluation of materiality; they were critical to the "indication value" of the
delinquency. Hence, consumer representatives were probably correct in asserting that
a single delinquency, of itself, should not be a default.
129. A.B. 1057, § 422,203(1). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Am: § 2.203(1).

Michigan Law R._.evifJ'{lJ

[Vol, 72:1

sjble in a unilfl.t!;!ral sense; to !jet dmrn statutqry guidelines for such
contracts would also have been impossible. Consumer representatives
readily agreed to eliminate these provisions, Tp.ei;r pri111-Firy concern
was really the right to def~r payments. Yet, without limitations this
provision woµld also be unworkable, for it would allow the debtor to
defer all installments indefinitely, Thus, the problem at the first
stage was narrowed to finding a mutually satisfactory combination
of a strict default definition. plus a restricted unilateral deferral
right, The result Wfl.S that a complex list of limitations accompanied
the unilateral deferral right,130 while default was defined as a single
delip.quency of wore than ten days or a material breach of some other
covenant.
This agreement, however, proved to be short-lived, as aecondstage creditor representatives were far from satisfied. Even aa limited,
the concept of up.ilateral deferral waa disconcerting, especially to
consumer finance comp,mies. It was seen as a source of accounting
problems, especia.lly for computerized credit operations, and. as a
papenvork burden since every clelinquent debtor wpuld have to be
notified of his deferral right. M,oreover, ~d one of the most significant creditor objections, contract adjustments have always been
seen as ~ accommodation to the cu~tomer, and creditors thought
that they should be able to choo~e those customers to whom such
favors should be extended. Where the customer has a legitimate
reason (such as illness or layoff) for his inability to make a payment,
creditors ip.ay normally be willing to make adjustment. But the
thought of a deadbeat being able to defer payments at will was a
particularly bitter pill.
Due largely to the efforts of consumer finance company representatives, an uneasy compromise was eventually reached. The
l.lnilateral deferral right was thrown out entirely, and the definition
of default for nonpayment became concurrent delinquency of more
than ten days on any two installments.131 The rationale was that
giving the debtor one "free" missed payment is tantamount to an
automatic deferral. The creditor cannot take action against the
debtor for one delinquent payment. However, the creditor knows
when default occurs, accountin~ problems are minimized, and the
130. Among the limitations were: (I) No payment could be deferrecl for IIJore than
180 dars; (2) no right of deferral would exist for any of the first six installments; and
(3) n9 more than two installments coulcl be deferred in any twelve-month period.
1/ll. Wisconsin Consumer Al;t § 425.103(2)(a). If tl).e interval between payments is
m9;re th;m two mpµths, default is defip.ed ilS a, delinquency of more than 60 days. On
open-end plans, default is failur~ to :iµake payment wl).en due on two occasiqns within
a 12-month period, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.103(2)(b).
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choice as to who obta,ins a furth~r deferral remains with the
creditor.132 Of coµrse, a special provision was p.~eded where the
debtor failed to pay the fin~! installment. Creditors also ~onyinced
consumer represen~tives t:4at special treatment sh,;mld be given to
failure to pay the first installment.133 It was agreed that the! d,efiniti9n
of {iefault in either case would be failure to make ~uch payment
within forty days of the date dut.134
•
The Nation;tl. ComIJ).ission takes a somewhat pt!-zzling position
on this point. It suggests that ~efault shquld not 'J:?e d~fip.~d l;>y
statute, but should be left to the determination of the contra,cting
parties. It adds, however, that default should re$ult only frqi:µ the
breach of "major contract provisions" <!lld that it should not result
solely because the creditor believes the prospect of payment has been
impajred.135 Apparently, the Coxp.mission simply 4ope~ that crecljtors
wjll follow these guidelines, but it suggests no reason for its obkctiqn
to statutory enforcement pf this hoped-for ;result. Another g.~cid~d
difference b~tween the Commission point of view aI!d the WCA is
that the Commissjpn considers failure to make timely payments to
Pe a breach of a major contract provisio:Q.136 and believe§ that fl.ffprding the debtor a rigJ.it tq cure offers sufficient protecti9n f;rom improvidep.t creditor a~tion.137
Notably, the DCCC Special Committee has changed its positjop.
and now suggests regulation of t:4~ definition of default to an ~~tent
nearly identical to tp.~ recommendation of the National ComµiissionJ88
132. Of course, the WCA allow~ deferral by agree~ent (~ectiq!l ~~.g0f(!)), a!l4 aJs9
;illow~ agreements permitting unila~eral !fefeq;il :i.t the ~lec;tion of the geditqi; (~~ctj9:t1
422.204(8)). Since the debtor may prepay all or part of the obligation at any time without pepalty (section 422~08), tp.e creditqr'11 unilateral deferral right will not worl,. to
the detriment pf tl!e debtor except to tlie CJ1:te11t of µte deferral i;h~rge,
133. Many creditors seem to attach special importance to the first installment, interpreting failure to pay it promptly as an indication of bad faith on the part of the
debtor. Arguably, failure to make this payment is a !llOre material breach ¢.an failure
to pay some other in~tallment. In addition, the first installment is occasionally larger
than the remaining scheduled installments, for it is more like a part of the do,vnpayment than of the amount fin~ceq. A~ ~y r.J.t~, CQnsuzg~j'." repr~se!l~tive§ q!d. not
see this as a common area of abuse or an unreasonable creditor desire,
134. Wisconsin Consumer ,Act § 425.1Q3(2}(a). IQiti~Uy, ~ a resµJt qf. 11, i:lerjµtl ~µ-or,
the WCA. did not reflect th!! i\greement reached QP. this pqjpt, Rath~, a ,:Iefatilt l!-S tP
the first or last installment was defined as mere failure to pay when ,:lue, Thi~ eqor
has p.Qw been q:>rrected by ad):n.injs~tive rule. See WIS. ADMIN. CopE, :flANKffi9 § ~0.60
(197;1),
135. COMIIIISSIOij REPO~T, ~upr{l note g3, at 25.
136. Id.
137. Iµ. See discussjo11- in t~t accol)lpan~g notes l;l9-58 infrq.
138. The UCCC Redraft makes enforceable an agreeI)lent defining defauJt ••only to
tpe ~tept that {I) th~ consµmer fails to I)lake a p~}'!!ll;nt a§ reqµiraj by ?gr~!!!l!ent;
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2. Cure of Default
A statutory right to cure default requires that before the creditor
is entitled to take any action he notify the debtor of the default and
give him a certain .amount of time within which to pay the amount
of any delinquent installments, without acceleration, or to tender
whatever performance is necessary to cure any default other than
nonpayment. Having cured, the debtor is reinstated, without penalty, to the position he would have been in had no default occurred.
The National Commission found in its survey of creditor practices
that before declaring an account delinquent, banks allow an average
of 12.2 days and finance companies an average of 16.5 days.180 It
recommends a statutory 14-day cure period, which would merely be
the adoption of current industry practice.140
Because of this industry practice, and because they had previously agreed to accept a cure provision in the UCCC negotiations,141 Wisconsin creditors were not adverse to the concept of a
right to cure. In fact, some of them were staunchly in favor of it. 142
Rather, the debate centered upon questions of (1) the procedure to
be-followed in effecting notice and cure, (2) whether the right should
be forfeitable, and (3) exceptions to the right (that is, when, if at all,
the creditor should be able to take action without affording the
debtor notice and opportunity to cure).
First-stage negotiators eventually agreed that the procedure for
notice and cure set out in Original A.B. I 057 should be scrapped.
It had provided that notice of the right and initiation of the running
of the cure period could be effected only by service of a complaint in
an ac6on brought by the creditor for possession of collateral.143 If
the debtor cured within fifteen days after service, the action would
be dismissed. 144 Negotiators saw no virtue in requiring the creditor
or (2) the prospect of payment, performance, or realization of collateral is significantly
impaired ••••" UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.109 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972),
The UCCC contains no provision restricting events constituting default.
139. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 25, 43.
140. Id. at 25.
141. Although the UCCC contains no right to cure, the Wisconsin UCCC legislative
advisory committee had included in its recommendation a one-time-per-transaction
twenty-day cure period.
142. The collection practice of sending simulated legal process to delinquent debtors
has recently come under attack as being unconscionable. Since this practice had been
effective in inducing payment, and since affording the debtor a right to cure entails
sending him an official notice of the right, many creditors welcomed the change.
143. The only way to obtain possession under the WCA is by filing suit. See text
accompanying notes 167-76 infra.
144. A.B. 1057, §§ 425.206-.207. See NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT §§ 5,206-,207. The
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to file suit in order to bring his default rights to fruition.145 Moreover, this procedure seems particularly frivolous when the creditor
does not want possession of the collateral or when there is no security
interest at all. Therefore, first-stage negotiators settled, without
serious difficulty, on a simplified procedure. Upon default, a fifteenday cure period begins to run from ·written notice by the creditor of
the customer's right to cure. The passage of this period is a prerequisite to the creditor's exercise of any other rights or remedies.146
In keeping with the new definition of default, cure is effected by
tender of any balance due or by "tendering performance necessary
to cure any default other than nonpayment of amounts due."147 In
retrospect, all negotiators seem quite content with this much more
workable procedure.
The second right-to-cure issue during negotiation was whether
a recalcitrant debtor should ever lose the right to cure, and, if so,
when. Suppose, for example, that a debtor buys a new car on credit,
the contract to be paid off in three years, with payments to be due
on the first of the month. For the first six months of the contract, the
debtor consistently makes his payment twenty to twenty-five days
late. Each month he receives at least two late notices and, occasionally, a phone call from the bank's collection department. In the
seventh month, the debtor makes no payment, and on the eleventh
day of the eighth month the bank, having received no payment,
MCCA retains the basic scheme, which requires that the creditor file suit in order to
initiate the running of the cure period. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 7.108(1). The
basic changes are that under the MCCA the debtor may cure at any time prior to
judgment and that the creditor may require the debtor to pay court costs and a performance deposit in addition to making up back payments. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT
Acr § 7.108(2). There are no exceptions to the MCCA right to cure, nor is there any
limit to the number of times a debtor may cure during the course of a transaction.
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 7.108(5).
145. Arguably, the only reason the creditor would want the cure period to run is
so that he can accelerate the loan and sue for possession. However, where the debtor
would cure, putting the creditor to the expense of filing suit seems unnecessary. Moreover, even where the debtor does not cure, the expense is unjustifiable unless the
creditor actually wants possession of the collateral. It might be argued that the creditor
who does not want the collateral has no need for the cure period to run, since he can
always try to induce payment through normal collection methods. However, the ability
to accelerate the obligation is of value to the creditor even though he does not seek
possession of collateral. It allows him to write off the debt and attempt to collect it or
assign it to a collector as a lump sum. This saves him the trouble of keeping track of
how many payments have gone unpaid. Perhaps the draftsmen of the NCA intended
to inhibit acceleration to as great an extent as possible regardless of impact on creditor
operations. The Wisconsin consumer representatives, however, sought only to provide
the debtor with an opportunity to cure while minimizing the impact on creditor
practices.
146. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 425.104-.105.
147. Wisconsin Consumer Act§ 425.105(2).
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sends the debtor notice of his right to cure, Within fifteen days the
debtor makes the two back payments plus delinquency fees, and the
contract fa reinstated. The debtor then misses the ninth payJP.ent.
When the tenth payment is ten days past due, notice of right to cure
is again sent, and the debtor cures within the fifteen-day period,
When the eleventh ip.stallment is not received, the bank contacts the
debtor in hope of helping him solve his apparent 6.nancial woesperhaps to extend the contnict and reduce the monthly payments,
perhaps to consolidate other obligatiops iµto a single lower monthly
payment. The debtor is not cooperative; he may even be surly.
At this point, the bank has invested substaptjal effort in the
account, with no let-µp in sight. The cost of collecting the debt is
beginning to approach the profit on the loan. Some banks, especially those that prefer not to deal with higher risk borrowers,
quickly become fed up with troublesome debtors and make a point
of getting them off the books as soon as possible. In negotiations,
creditor representatives argued that at some poiJ1t a recalcitrant
debtor ought to lose his right to cure; an unlimited right to cure
could cause creditors a great deal of troµble and possibly some untoward expense, At the bottom of their argument may have been
the feeling that the debtor does not deserve an unlimited right to
cure.148
Consumer representatives saw no reason why the debtor should
ever lose the right to cure, for if the debtor cures, the creditor re,
ceives full interest on the late installments plus a delinquency fee
that should at least help to cover the cost of collection. However,
consumer representatives were willing to limit the right to cure
since, at the end of first-stage negotiations, the debtor still had a
µnilateral deferral right. Thus, even if the debtor were to lose his
right to cure, he could still eliminate any nonpayment default by
electing to .defer the delinquent payment. Consequently, at the
end of first-stage negotiations, the debtor was allowed only one cure
opportunity in any twelve-month period.
As discussed above, the unilateral .debtor deferral right, ev13n as
limited in first-stage negotiations, was distressing to many secondstage creditors. They were intent on eliminating the right, but its
148. Although it was only articulated tangentially, I received the impression from
interviewing creditors and creditor representatives that the specter of the deadbeat
loomed over the negotiations. The true deadbeat, a debtor who has the ability to pay
but does not, is probably quite rare. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 43. The
Commission's survey showed deadbeathood to be among the least common reasons for
failure to meet contractual terms. Nevertheless, when a creditor encounters the real
thing, it makes his blood boil.
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existehce had played a key tole in the consumer agreement to limit
the right to cure. Heflce, second-stage creditor insistence on the
elimination of tiiillaterai deferral necessarily undermined the fitststage agreerrtent reached on cure-just as it undermined the firststage agreement oh default. Finally, as part of the decision to
eliminate the unilateral deferral right, the negotiators agreed to
ptovide the debtor with a right to cure default twice within any
twelve-month period.149 Thus, our hypothetical debtor, having cured
default fot the second time within twelve mohths, would lose his
right to cure until one year after the first cure. If, at some time
prior to that date, he is in default, the creditor's right to seek
possession of the collatetal accrues immediately. The right to cure itself never changes; that is, wliete the right to cure exists, the respective rights and obligations of the debtor and the creditor are unaffected by the number of times the debtor has previotisly cured.
In retrospect, the Wisconsin ctihsumet representatives ate unhappy with the result reached, They ate consoled, however, by their
belief that because the right to cute is difficult to lose, such an event
should be rare,150
The final cute-related issue, that of exceptions to the tight, was
resolved at second-stage negotiations,151 Cteditots argued that special
citcumstances, such as where a creditor has a pdssessory' security interest in securities that threaten to decline rapidly in valtie or where
he believes that the debtor inteiids to conceal or remove collateral
from the jurisdiction, may require a secured creditor to act quickly.
They argued that prohibiting action that could prevent such losses
was not in the interest of the paying consumer, who would Ultimately shoulder the burden of the loss.
Consumer representatives were easily convinced that, when collateral in the hands of the debtor threatens to decline severely in
value, it is in the interest of all parties to liquidate it. Consequently,
an e~ception was created fot this situation.152 Fot a number of
reasons, hoiv-evet, consumer representatives were not willing to
149. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.105(3),
150. Since the great majority of defaults ate due to events beyond the debtor's
control, see ComnssmN REPORT, supra note 23, at 43, the number of defaulting debtors
who get more than teh days behind on two payments and are then able to cure should
be few, The number who do sci repeatedly, yet in good faithj should be extraordinarily
rare.
151. First-stage negotiations had not produced agreement, and A,B. 1057 as modified
in December contained no exceptions to the right to cure, although a restraining order
to protect collatetal had been created, The banks continued to be involved in the
negotiations, however, and played an important role in the resolution of this issue.
152, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 4-25.105(4).

38

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:1

create any further exceptions. First, they believed that creditors
sometimes rely on the possibility of concealment or removal of collateral as an excuse for an otherwise unjustifiably quick repossession.
They also believed that actual preventive repossessions were quite
rare and that the over-all economic impact of prohibiting such repossessions would not be great. In addition, they had serious doubts
about the reliability of most reports concerning removal in that
these are normally received from neighbors, estranged spouses, and
relatives, many of whom have axes to grind or are merely repeating
gossip. Finally, consumer representatives had agreed at first-stage
negotiations to allow a creditor to obtain a court order restraining
a debtor from jeopardizing collateral. They believed that such an
order, backed by the court's contempt power, would effectively
stifle most potential skips and adequately protect creditors. As a
result of these views, consumer representatives took a firm stand
against any additional exceptions to the right to cure. Creditor
representatives were unable to soften this position.153
The ability o~ consumer representatives to withstand political
pressure to limit drastically the right to cure is extremely significant,
in my view, because this is the only point at which the WCA cure
provisions force any substantial change in normal creditor operations. In general, a creditor will not repossess collateral soon after
default unless there is some special reason for believing that he
will not ultimately receive full payment. However, in these unusual
circumstances the fifteen-day delay will force creditors to alter
definitively their normal patterns. The impact of this change remains to be seen. 154
The cure procedure recommended by the National Commission
is essentially the same as that in the WCA. The Commission also
recommends that the repeatedly recalcitrant debtor lose his right
to cure and suggests that he be allowed to cure only three times
during the term of the contract.155 Although it is not clear whether
153. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.207.
154. One automobile finance company spokesman told me that quick repossession
occurs most commonly after the creditor has spent a lot of time with the debtor trying
to iron out the debtor's credit difficulties. If the creditor is skeptical about the debtor's
good faith, any delinquency immediately after the discussions is likely to be met with
immediate repossession. Consequently, the knowledge that quick action is prohibited
might decrease the willingness of some creditors to work with a debtor whose credibil•
ity is marginal.
155. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 25. The objective of any loss-of-cure
formula is apparently to draw the line between the good faith debtor, who should be
allowed to cure whenever he can, and the deadbeat, with whom the creditor should
presumably be allowed to deal more harshly. No rationale is given for the Commission's
choice of formulation, just as there really is none for the WCA choice, the latter
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the Commission considered exceptions to the right, it recommends
none.
Making nearly unanimous the view that some right to cure ought
to be afforded to the consumer, the UCCC Redraft has added cure
provisions.156 However, the proposed consumer protection falls far
short of that in either the WCA or the Commission Report. The
UCCC Redraft provides a once-per-transaction, twenty-day cure
period where the debtor is ten days delinquent on a scheduled payment.157 Further, there is no right to cure defaults other than nonpayment. The utility of such a limited right seems questionable.158
3. Recovery of Collateral

Upon default the UCC allows the secured creditor to, among
other things, take possession of the collateral without judicial process,169 sell it, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the outstanding debt.160 This ability to act quickly upon default assures the
creditor that the collateral will have maximum value when repossessed and that his potential loss will be minimized. The efficient
limitation of creditor losses clearly benefits the paying customer by
increasing the availability of secured loans and reducing creditor
overhead, which would othenvise be passed on to the consumer. In
spite of these benefits, however, this summary procedure has come
under serious constitutional attack. The attack, which stems from
the landmark Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance
having been simply a matter of compromise. I doubt, however, if it really makes much
difference, as long as more than one or two opportunities to cure during the contract
are provided. See note 150 supra.
156. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 5.110, .111 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972).
157. This, in effect, slightly modifies the definition of default. Until the debtor has
once been afforded his right to cure the creditor may not take action prior to the tenth
day of delinquency.
158. Its utility seems particularly questionable in light of the UCCC Redraft definition of default. When a single ten-day delinquency can result in loss of the right, there
has hardly been a distinction drawn between the good faith debtor and the deadbeat.
If the rationale is that the creditor is in a better position to draw this line than the
legislature, why provide a right to cure at all?
The limitation of the right to nonpayment defaults also seems unjustified. If the
default is failure to procure insurance or failure to assist in perfecting the security
interest, especially if the default arises out of ignorance, why should the debtor not be
given the opportunity to cure? Are these defaults somehow more material than nonpayment? Perhaps certain kinds of nonmonetary defaults are more dangerous to the
creditor's interests than delinquency in payment. If so, perhaps exceptions from the
right to cure are justified in those circumstances. But the broad exclusion of all nonmonetary defaults seems contrary to the objective of a right to cure.
159. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9--503.
160. UNIFORM COIIIMERµAL CODE § 9-504.
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Corp. 161 mid the inore recent decisioh in Fuentes v. Shevin,1° 2 centers upon the theory that the defaulting debtor, in being dispossessed
df the collatetal without notice ot opportunity to object, is d<:lprived
of his property without the due process of the law guarartteed by
the fourteenth amendment. The issue is now being litigated, 103 and
itS ultimate resolution is, as of this writing, uncertain. 104
A legislative dilemnHt, however, exists quite apart from the con•
stitutiorta1 oile: 165 Eveh if self-help repossession is constitutiomtlly
permissible, the legislature inust stili decide whether the admitted
urifairness to at least the occasional debtot166 can be sigrtificarttly teduced through procedural safeguards, whether such safeguards can
be constructed so as to have a mitlimal impact on creditor costs, and
whether the increase in costs, to the extent it is inescapable, is
justified by the amount of protection afforded the debtor.
The question of whether prejudgment self-help repossession
would be available in Wisconsin was never really in issue during
the WCA negotiations. In the eyes of consumer representatives, this
was not a hegdtiable matter. They believed that, regardless of increased creditor costs, no debtor should be deprived of his ptoperty
without having an opportunity to object. First-stage cr<:lditot' repre•
sehtatives were particularly concerned about preventing the complete loss of self-help repossession. Therefore, they did not press
161. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
162. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
163. A number of courts have considered this question. White, The Abolition of
Self-Help Reposses5ion: The Poor Pa'j Even More, 1973 WIS. L. REv. 503, MS I'.: n.1.

In the on~ case irl which the trial cotirt found self-he1p tepossession to be a denial
of due process, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground
that there was no state action involved. Adams V, Southern Cal. First Natl, Bank, 42
U.S.L.W, 2230 (Oct. 4, 1973), revg. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S,D, Cal. 1972).
For discussions of the state action aspects of such cases, see Martin, Secured Transac•
tions, 19 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 593, 638-41 (1973); White, supra, at 504-10.
164. See generally Regenfuss, Self-Help Remedies After Fuentes v, Sllevin, 47 FLA,
B.J. 155 (1973); White, supra note 163; Casenote, 8 LAND&: WATER L. REv, 315 (1978).
165, Even if the Court balances the various interests and tosts and d!!cld!!S, M
suggested by Professor White, that there is no due protess violation, see White, Stlfn'ti
note 163, at 510-30, such a holding is not binding on state legislatures, which remuln
free to provide their citizens with more protection than is required by the federal
Constitutiofi.
166. Surely, the repossession of collateral where the debtor bas a valid defense but
n~ tlpportunity to assert it is an unfortunate occttrrence. Not only is the ittt:Hvldual
ilijhred, but genetal confidence in the law is undermined. One consumer represchtatiVd
told nie that his legal aid clients invariably felt left ottt and that they perceived some
fotiri of conspiracy bet.ween the courts and the tar dealers. He felt that the social tost
of permitting prejudgment self-help repossession far exceeds the pecuniary cost of
denying it.
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£or a prejudgment self-help remedy, but argued vigorously fot the
availabllity of self-help executioh.167
Original A.B. 1057 required the cteditor who sought to re~
possess to file suit for possessiort. If the customer wished to bbject, he
would have five days to file a demand for a hearing, which would be
scheduled as soon as possible. If a "substantial question" as to the
creditor1s rights should appear, a final hearing wotild be held.168 At
tio time, either before or after judgment for possession, wciS self~
help repossession pertnitted.169
At the outset, however, consumer representatives recdgn1zed that
the elimination of postjudgment self-help repossession was art. exten°
sitln well beyond the limited requirements of Sniadach176 and that
etnpioym.eht of the sheriff to repossess collateral is slow and expensive. They were willing ta permit self-help repossession aftet judgment if provisions that adequately inhibited violence could be
drafted.171 At their urging, the WCA, by the end of first-stage
negotiations, provided that, in seir-help repossessforts, the creditor
could neithet tommit a breach of the peace nor enter a dwelling
used by the customer as his residehce.
The negotiators chose not tb force the Wfaconsih courts to devise
strikingly new procedures, but father decided to use the Wisconsin
small claims courts as the fon1nii72 for obta1tiing judgment for
possession. Since the return date ih small claims courts can be as
eariy as eight days after mailing of process,i73 this forum. provides a
speedy resolution of the possession issue. The requirement that the
debtor request a hearing was elin1mated, so that the WCA simply
i67. The banks presumed that a -very small portion of defaulting debtors would
actually appear and raise valid defenses. Thus, they assumed that once the return ciate
passed, they would be in substantially the same position as under pre-WCA law.
168. A.B. 1057, § 425.208. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.208.
169. A.B. 1057, § 425.204. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.204. The MCCA contains
a similar provision requiring judicia1 process iii the repossession of collateral. MonEL
CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 7.202. However, the MCCA provides for the issuance of such
process before judgment where necessary to obtain jurisdittion over the debtor or
where the debtor "is about to remove the property from tlie state With the intent to
defraud the creditor?' Moi:JEI. CoNsUMER CREDIT ACT § 7.205(3).
170. Of. NA'tloNAi. CoNsiJt.ifa Acr § 5.208, Coni.Ilieilt 1 (indicatitlg that Stiiddach
supplies the primary rationale for tlie NCA approach).
171. Presumably, although there is no comment to this effect, the NCA rationale
underlying the tomplete elimination of self-help repossession is that the likeiihbod of
violence is decreased if the sheriff is always present.
172. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(1). Of course, the small claims court jurisdictional limit on amount in issue, WIS. STAT. § 299,01(3) {1971), was mad!! inapplicable.
173, Wis, STAT. § 299.05(3) (1971).
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provides that the debtor may appear on the return date and plead
orally to the complaint.174 The issue of possession is then decided;
the two-stage hearing procedure set out in Original A.B. 1057 is
eliminated.175 The right to possession, however, is the only issue to
be resolved;176 if the creditor wishes a money judgment, for either
damages or deficiency, a second action must be brought. Of course,
once judgment is entered, the creditor may always choose to enlist
the sheriff's aid in taking possession of the collateral.177 The nego•
tiators also recognized that unless the prejudgment repossession
provisions and the right to cure provisions were related, an additional eight-day delay would be encountered while the creditor
waited for the debtor's right to cure to expire. Since they saw no
purpose in such a delay, the negotiators provided that the creditor
may bring his action for possession at any time after default, but
that the return day may not be set prior to the expiration of the cure
period. 178
Once bank representatives accepted the abolition of prejudgment
repossession, the negotiators worked together with very little conflict in the development of this procedure. Their mutual satisfaction
with the result was undoubtedly the key to the fact that second-stage
negotiators never seriously objected to the over-all scheme. Only two
notable changes were made at the second stage, neither of which
affected the general approach to repossession.
First, nearly all creditors were dissatisfied with the inability of
the repossessing party to enter a dwelling. This requirement, they
felt, would lead to the absurd result that household goods would
have to be left out on the lawn before they could be repossessed. They
. argued that the UCC breach-of-the-peace restriction170 effectively
prevents violence, and that, even if it is not sufficient, the creditor
should at least be able to enter a residence with the consent of the
debtor. Consumer representatives, however, feared that the consent
of the debtor might often be less than voluntary. 180 They were willing
174. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(1)(d).
175. See text accompanying note 168 supra. If at this hearing neither party is able
to establish a right to possession, which is possible since neither party is likely to be
prepared to discuss sophisticated legal or factual questions, the matter would un•
doubtedly be continued. In this instance, the WCA procedure would approximate that
of Original A.B. 1057.
176. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(1)(e). For a severe criticism of this policy,
see Heiser, supra note 27, at - .
177. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(5)(a).
178. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(6),
179. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 9-503.
180. Consumer representatives believed that repossessors are often quite incon•
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to back down only to the extent that the repossessor be allowed to
enter a residence at the "voluntary request" of the customer.181 This
solution did not truly satisfy many creditors, but consumer representatives were quite firm. They felt that once judgment is entered,
most customers will peacefully give up the collateral.182 However,
even if problems are created for creditors, consumer representatives
felt that a repossessor should not be allowed to enter a dwelling
under less than amicable circumstances unless a sheriff is present.
The second change was made primarily at the suggestion of consumer finance representatives and without much conflict. In the
interest of reducing costs, a provision was added permitting the action for possession to be commenced by an officer or agent of the
creditor even though such person may not be an attomey.183
Barring unforeseen difficulties, the scheme worked out in Wisconsin should not have disastrous cost consequences.184 First, obtaining judgment for possession need not, of itself, cause delay. Judgment
may be obtained on the fifteenth day following notice of the right to
cure, and collateral may be repossessed within the hour. Second, the
costs of obtaining judgment, although hardly negligible, have been
minimized, primarily by eliminating the need for an attorney. If
the issue of possession can be settled at the hearing, as should normally be the case, the only cost increase will be that due to the added
time spent by the employee in presenting the creditor's case. However, if the creditor has not received notice of the customer's defense,
siderate of the interests of the debtor. For a collection of repossession cases, see Hogan,
The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. REv. 205,
212 n.30 (1962).
181. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.206(2).
182. Where the customer has appeared to defend the action for possession and lost,
this assumption is probably valid. However, having received notice of cure plus process
regarding the action for possession will probably not soften very many debtors who
would have otherwise objected to the repossessor's efforts. If these documents induce
neither cure nor appearance at the hearing, they will probably just be added to the
already large pile of notices the average debtor receives prior to repossession. Certainly,
these documents should reduce the number of debtors who are surprised by repossession.
However, I suspect that many uncooperative debtors are not at all surprised when the
repossessor knocks at the door.
183. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(l)(a). Unfortunately, since this section provides only that the action "may be commenced by" such a person, it is not clear
whether the person is authorized to take a default or, when the debtor disputes the
issue, to argue the creditor's case. This uncertainty remains to be settled through
litigation or regulation. Presumably, the section was intended to make creditor attorneys entirely optional in such proceedings, and I assume that that will be its effect.
184. Professor Johnson, in his extensive analysis of self-help automobile repossession
in California, suggests that the costs of eliminating self-help repossession could be as
much as 381 dollars per repossession. Johnson, supra note 122, at 34. However, his
assumptions differ considerably from the circumstances under the WCA. See id. at 22.
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.he will most likely be unprepared to ttleet any claims beyond questions regarding default and cure. In this instance, the matter is likely
to be continued and will probably necessitate the emp1oytnellt of an
attorney. Costs ate then likely to be considerable, hut they are
cettainly justified.
The soundness of the legislative decision to eliminate prejudgment repossession turns ort whether the increased costs are balanced.
by the societal benefit received. The benefit is si:tnply ~ function c,f
the number of debtors that ,vill raise valid claims at the hearing on
pbSsession. If, for exa:tnple, the cost of the average repossession is
increased by thirty dollars and only one debtor in five hundred
taises a valid daim, the decision made in the WCA will have beert
wrong. While it is, of course, impossible to place a dollar value on
the prevention df an improper repossession; fifteen thousand dollars
seems too high a price. On the other hand, if fifty valid defenses are
raised in five hundred actions for possession, the choice made by the
negotiators was probably correct. Not only will a substantial number
of improper repossessions have been prevented, but the industry
practices giving rise to valid defenses should begin to change as welL
There is a second, less significant factor to be considered in
evaluating the legislative decision. If a substantial number of invalid
defenses are raised, a possibility which has been suggested else,
where,185 perhaps the system should be altered. The societal benefit
received when an invalid defense is raised is minimal. Yet, a sub•
stantial number of such claims could severely increase costs, particularly if the majority of these claims cannot be disposed of at
the initial hearing. In my opinion, the probability that a meaningful
number of debtors will raise valid defenses is not so small that
refotm should not be attempted. However, the longevity of these
teforins should rest in the hands of consumers. If a miniscule proportion of valid defenses are raised, either creditor conduct is largely
ptoper or the notice-and-oppottrtnity protections are not working.
In either case, consumer advocates should be open to revision of the
procedures.
In contrast to the WCA, the UCCC suggests no limitations on
the UCO repossession provisions. The Special Committee is ap•
parerttly cortsidering a change, although it has made no recommendation as yet. The UCCC Redraft states that sufficient time was not
185. See id. at 33. See also R. DOLPHIN, AN ANALYSIS OF EcoNol\lIC AND PERSONAL
FACTORS LEADING TC5 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 90-92 (1965); Kripke, supra note 46, at
480-81 (discussirlg the story, "not often :publidzed by iegal aid bqreaus," of tl}c existence
of "real deadbeats').
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available to atten1pt to resolve the adjustments that may be required
by the evolving law following Sniadach,186
The National Commission, on the other hand; suggests a procedure nearly identical to that found in the WCA.187 With "full
understanding" that substantial rate increases and severely curtailed
credit availability ate likely to occur, the Commission bases its
recommendation on the concept "that an individual has the right to
continued 'use and possession of property (free) from arbitrary encroachment.' " 188 It suggests that "the tight ... to an opportunity' to
be heard n1ust apply across the board, irrespective of the type of
repossession-'-'self-help,' replevin, or whatever."189
Although I may be guilty of oversinlplification, the Comitlissiort
does not appear to be concerned with the possibility of increased
rates or decreased credit availability, nor with the proportion of
debtors who would actually benefit from notice and an opportttnity
to be heard. Certainly Fuentes does not suggest that due process requires such absolute disregard for the interests of the typical, paying
consumer.190 Perhaps a presumption that the cost inctect5e will not
be unduly burdensome is implicit i11 the Go111n1ission;s recommenda~
tion.
4. Some Reflections
The delay in the atcnial of tepdssession tights and the requirement that a judgment be obtained before repossession may well be
among the greatest cost-impact areas of the WCA. The National
186. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note, iv (Working Redraft No. 4,
1972).
187. In fact, the entire cure-repossession package recommended by the Commission
is essentially the same as that of the WCA:
At the time the creditor sends notice ,of the cure p_eriod (14 days), and prior to
actual repossession (whether by replevin with_ the aid of state officers or by selfhelp), hi! may simultatieously send ncitice bf the underlying claim against the
debtor, and the debtor should be afforded ah opportunity to be heard in cotitt oh
the merits of such claim. Such time period for an oppottuhity t6 be heard may run
concurrently with the cure period.
CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23; at 29. Moreover, the Commission's specific approval
of the WCA summons as providing adequate notice of the pending claim suggests that
the Commission may have been strongly influenced by the Wisconsin approach. See
id. at 30.
188. Id. at 30, quoting Fuentes v. Slievin, 407 U,S, 671 81 (1972).
189. Id. at 30.
190. Among the Fuentes Court's examples of circitmstances hi \vhich notice and
hearing may be postponed are those cases in 1vhich the individual's interest is out'weighed by that of the public, such as seizures on behalf of the United States for llie
collection of ta.xes, 407 U.S. at 91-92, citing Phillips v. Corlmiissiotier, 283 U.S. 589
(1931), and preventing a bank failure, 407 U.~. at 92, citing Fahey v. Mallonee, 3ll2 U.S.
i'!!> (1946), See White, supra note 16¾1 at 510,
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Commission survey disclosed that "creditors thought the single most
important remedy or contract provision in a secured consumer credit
transaction was the right to take a security interest in the goods . . .
and the concomitant right to r~possess if the debtor defaulted." 101
Although it was unable to predict the effects with any certainty, the
Commission thought any restriction of these remedies would probably have a significant impact on rates and credit availability. 102
Prior to the WCA, the creditor was able to repossess a delinquent
debtor's collateral as soon as he decided to do so. Under the WCA,
the creditor must normally wait at least fifty-five days after the initial
delinquency. 193 Moreover, the creditor must wait at least eight days
to obtain judgment even if his decision to repossess is made after the
cure period has run.194 Therefore, the delays required by the WCA
will run from a minimum of eight to as long as fifty-five days.
In the case of automobiles, which depreciate at a significant rate,
any delay in obtaining possession after the decision to repossess results in losses. Data from four of the creditors consulted by Professor
Johnson in his study of automobile repossessions in California
showed that 73.8 per cent of new-car and 75.3 per cent of used-car
repossessions occur within sixty days after default in payment, and
22.8 per cent of new-car and 17.7 per cent of used-car repossessions
occur within thirty days of default in payment.19 G Professor Johnson
also calculates the cost of delay, once the decision to repossess has
been made, to be $2.70/day for new cars and $1.30/day for used
cars. 196 If these California figures are applicable to Wisconsin, the
191. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 29-30.
192. Id. at 30.
193. Presuming that the debtor's payments are due monthly and no default other
than nonpayment occurs, there is no default until the debtor is forty days delinquent
(ten days delinquent on the second unpaid installment). If notice of right to cure is
sent immediately, and if the action for possession is filed within seven days of the
notice, the return date may be set on the day that the cure period runs out-fifteen
days following notice of right of cure. Hence, judgment for possession may be obtained
fifty-five days after the due date of the first unpaid installment.
194. Of course, the creditor could file the action for possession before deciding to
repossess, but this seems an unnecessary expense. See note 145 supra and accompanying
text. It is not likely to become a common practice.
The eight-day minimum predicted here is probably conservative. It assumes that
the action can be filed immediately and that there will be no delay in taking the
default. The practical minimum will probably be more like ten to twelve days.
195. Johnson, supra note 122, at 6. Default here means the default that stimulated
the repossession. This is rarely the first default. As suggested above, see note 154 supra,
creditors often try to work out a new arrangement with a defaulting debtor before
resorting to repossession. According to Professor Johnson, the national work-out to
repossession ratio is 2.8/1. Johnson, supra, at 9.
196. Professor Johnson estimates the depreciation cost over thirty days to average
$57 for new cars and $31 for used cars, Johnson, supra note 122, at 34, Further, he
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minimum delay loss on a new car will be twenty-one dollars and
more than twenty per cent of the new car repossessions (those delayed as much as nventy-five days) will result in losses in excess of
sixty-five dollars per car.197 Since five to ten per cent of all automobile
contracts ultimately end in repossession,198 the cost impact of the
WCA provisions will be appreciable.
As mentioned above, one of the most seriously affected creditor
groups, the manufacturer-affiliated automobile finance companies,
did not participate in the WCA negotiations. Their absence was particularly significant in the drafting of the provisions that increase the
costs of repossessing collateral. One negotiator told me that throughout these discussions there was a feeling that this was really "their
issue" and that at any moment they would show up to present their
point of view. They never did. It is impossible, of course, to determine precisely what modifications would have been made if the automobile finance companies had participated. Their interests were
represented in many respects by the banks, which formed what was
probably the most influential creditor group in the negotiations. On
the other hand, the passage of the bill was always in doubt, and the
automobile financers could probably have exacted some meaningful
concessions in exchange for their support. ·1 doubt that they could
have effected significant changes in the repossession procedure. The
consumer representatives were adamant on the elimination of nonjudicial repossession, and the procedure could not have been streamlined much more than it was. However, the automobile financers
might well have reduced the periods of delay in the accrual of repossession rights. Perhaps they could have obtained a more stringent
definition of subsequent defaults-that is, default after having cured
once or, perhaps, twice. Quite possibly they could have obtained
estimates opportunity cost-the cost due to the loss of the use of the funds the creditor
would have received but for the delay-to average $24 for new cars and $8 for used
cars for thirty days. Id. These totals work out to $2.70 per day for new cars and $1.30
per day for used cars. But see White, supra note 164, at 521 n.54, where Professor White
suggests that these costs should be scaled down to monthly rates of $68 for new cars
and $32 for used cars.
197. Of course, during the delay the creditor will continue his efforts to induce
payment. He may well be aided in this effort by the WCA in that the creditor is now
permitted to engage in the otherwise unconscionable collection practice of sending
official looking documents and legal process to the debtor. See note 142 supra. Before
this practice was generally banned, it was presumably effective. To the extent the
debtor makes payment, and, hence, to the extent the creditor would otherwise have
repossessed too early, all parties benefit. Reduction of such premature repossessions is,
of course, the goal of consumer advocates. Moreover, to the extent that such repossessions are prevented, not only is unfairness decreased, but delay losses are reduced. It
seems unlikely, however, that such gains would approximate the losses.
198. Johnson, supra note 122, at 13.
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additional exigent-circumstance exceptions to the right to cure. At
any rate, the absence of this substantial credit group was undoubtedly a significant factor in determining the ultimate scope of
theWCA
C.

Restrictions ori Security Interests

The case of Willidms v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.100 is a
classic; if not typical, exampie of how the unrestricted availability of
cohsumer ptbperty as security can be abused. 1n that case the standardized conditional sales tontract used by appel1ee retail furniture
store contained an add-on security dause. As long as the customer
maintained an accouht the outstanding balance of which had never
been zero, any debt incurred by the purchase of goods on credit was
secured by ail gdods previously purchased by that customer on credit.
In I 962, the appellant, a 1ong-time customer of the store, had reduced her ba1artce to 164 dollars. She then purchased a 515-dollar
steteo and defaulted shortly thereafter. The store obtained a replevin
judgment for all items purchased from it by the appellant since
1957. Ort grouhds :hot solely related to the add-on clause, the appellate court heid that the transaction could be found to be unconscionable.200
Rather than relying solely on unconscionabi1ity clauses, modern
consumer-credit legislation usually contains specific restrictions on
the taking of security interests. A key presumption running throughout such legislation fa that there is nothing abusive about taking a
purchase-money security interest, that is, a security interest in an
item the purchase of which was facilitated by the extension or
credit.201 There is also Substantial agreement among draftsmen concerning the treatment of security interests in credit sales. However,
no such general agreement exists as to the restrictions applicable to
security interests in loans.
The Wisconsin negotiations over restrictions on security interests
199. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
200. The court held tliat1 in light of all the circumstantes, the ttial cotttt could
refuse to etlforce the contract if it found it to be uncoI1Stionab1e under scctidti !!•SU!!
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Among the conttibuting circumstances, in additioh
to the oppressive security interest, were that the customer was on relief and supporting
seven children on a monthly stipend of 218 dollars artd that the customer's fimtntlal
situation was well known to the salesman. 350 F.2d at 448.
201. Put another ivay, the risk of losing the item purchased can hardly outweigh
the value bf the credit that mad~ its acquisition possible. Obviously, and less obliquely,
if the ctistbmer needs a refrigerator, the risk of losing it to repossession cannot be so
great that he should be prohibited ftoin ol:ltaining it. JJut see MoDEt CoNsUMlllt Ctti:ntl'
ACT §§ 2.411(2)(b), .411(4)(a), discussed in notes 215-16 infra,

November 1973]

The Wisconsin Cbnsumer Act

49

for the most part paralleled. these general trends. Ifowever, they were
quite complex because of the diverse interests involved; even a quite
flarrow prohibition oii the taking of a patticti1ar type of collateral
could have a trushirtg impact o:ri businessmen who rely heavily o:ri
that type. Even though consumer advocates felt that the taking of
excessive security interests could be a severe abuse, they were also
aware that thete was a real danger of being overprotective.

I.

Credit Sales

The draftsmen of consumer-credit legislation generally agree that
a retail seller or indirect sales financer should not be able to look to
the general property of the debtor for security unless the goods sold
or services rendered bear some special relationship to the property
in which a security interest is to be taken. Presumably, this view is
based on the theory that if the goods sold are not sufficiently valuable
in themselves to secure the extension of credit1 a customer whose
personal creditworthiness cannot support the extension of credit
ought not to make the purchase.202 A special relationship is generaily
found where the goods soid or the services rendered. are closely connected to the property taken and the debt secured is substantia1,203
and in add-on sales.
Original A.B. 1057 provided that a dose connection exists where
the goods sold are installed upon or annexed to other goods or to
land, or where land is maintained, repaired, or improved as a result
of the sale of the goods or services, 204 This formulation was satisfactory to all Wisconsin negotiators. Differences arose, however, as to
when a debt is sufficiently substantial to justify a security interest in
closely connected property.
·
Under Original A.B. 1057, a debt was sufficiently substantial, in
the case of a security interest in realty, if it exceeded 3,000 dollars
or, in the case of a security interest in goods, if it exceeded 500 dollars.205 First-stage negotiators were not overly concerned with this
provision. Neither banks nor large retaiiers regularly take nonpur202. Examples of goods or services that have little vaiue as collateral are cosmetics,
books, darlcing lessons, kitchenware, and lieaith club memberships. Marty of these are
commonly the subject of door-to-door sales, which have received much attention of
late. See Sher, The "Cooling-Off' Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. R.Ev. 717,
721-24 (1968).
203. The "closely connected-substantial debt" terminology is taken from UNIFORM
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 2-407, Comment 1.
204. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(5). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.416(5).
205. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(5). See NATIONAL CbNsUME!t Act § 2.416(5). The MCCA
retains these limits. See MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr §§ 2.411(2)(c)-(d).
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chase-money security interests in credit sales. However, banks occasionally buy home improvement paper, which is normally secured
by an interest in the improved realty. Such transactions rarely exceed
3,000 dollars, and bank representatives warned that credit for smaller
home improvements would be restricted if the creditor could not
take a security interest in the house. The consumer representatives'
view was that the customer should never be required to risk losing
his home unless the creditor has facilitated a substantial improvement of the property. There was, however, no rational way to define
a "substantial improvement." Convinced that many legitimate home
improvement transactions would be restricted by the provision as it
stood, consumer adyocates agreed to reduce the obligation requirement from 3,000 dollars to 2,000 dollars.
At second-stage negotiations, savings and loan representatives
and, of course, home-improvement concerns were adamant about a
further reduction at least to 1,000 dollars.206 Consumer representatives were quite reluctant to reduce the requirement any further,
feeling that a 1,000-dollar transaction would not necessarily result
in a substantial improvement to the home. However, political considerations prevailed. Convinced that they must compromise to obtain the support of the savings and loan companies, consumer
representatives agreed at the last minute to reduce the requirement
to 1,000 dollars.
Although the issue was discussed, no negotiating group seriously
argued for a reduction of the 500-dollar requirement for security
interests in closely connected goods. One negotiator told me that the
only transactions in the 300- to 500-dollar range that they felt might
benefit other goods were substantial repair work on automobiles
or boats. Although repairmen were not represented in negotiations,
they are substantially protected by mechanics' lien laws.
The result reached in Wisconsin is very similar to the UCCC
provisions. The only difference is that the UCCC requires only a
300-dolla:r debt207 (as compared to a 500-dollar debt208) before a
security interest in closely connected goods is allowed. Both require
a debt of 1,000 dollars in the case of a security interest in realty. 200
The National Commission, on the other hand, appears to take a
206. To a lesser degree, consumer finance companies were also concerned, since they
occasionally buy home-improvement paper.
207. UNIFOro.l CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.407(1),
208. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422,417(l)(b).
209. UNIFORM CoNSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 2.407(1); Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422,417
(l)(c).
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different view. While it is not entirely clear that the Commission
considered the matter thoroughly or that it intended its recommendation to reach so far, 210 apparently it would never allow the seller
to take a nonpurchase-money security interest. This recommendation seems much too facile, especially with regard to security interests in land. Notwithstanding the notorious practices of the
home-improvement industry,211 a legitimate builder who significantly
improves the value of the debtor's home should not be expected to
rely solely on the debtor's credit rating.
The second special relationship in which the WCA allows nonpurchase-money security interests in a credit sale is found in add-on
sales-that is, where a seller has obtained a security interest in the
property of the customer as a result of a prior credit sale and now
wishes to secure a subsequent sale to the same customer with the
previously obtained interest. In astounding unanimity, the WCA,
the MCCA, the DCCC, and the National Commission all permit the
seller to secure the second debt212 in this way-with certain restrictions to prevent the interminable piling-up of security interests
found in Williams. 213 The matter was not a contested issue in
Wisconsin.
210. The Commission simply states that "the creditor should not be allowed to
take a security interest in goods or property of the debtor other than the goods or
property which are the subject of the sale," with the exception of add-on sales. CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 27. Perhaps the Commission does not consider one
who renders service a seller, or it might consider the connected property to be part of
the subject of the sale. At any rate, this short statement is not typical of the Commission Report in either its lack of clarity or its apparent oversimplification of the
problem.
211. See, e.g., Mathews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570, 137
N.W.2d 280 (1965); Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d
186 (1964).
212. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 422.418(1)-(2); MODEL CoNSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.412
(l); UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.408; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 27.
The only differences in approach are that the WCA and the MCCA allow add-on security interests only if the two obligations are consolidated into one, whereas the UCCC
and the Commission Report contain no such requirement. Hence, the WCA to some
extent coerces the consolidation of multiple obligations. It probably has little impact,
however, since the WCA goes to great lengths to insure that consolidations do not result
in greater expense to the customer, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.206, and the added
expense to the creditor in consolidating the t.110 obligations should be minimal. Nevertlleless, such coercion seems unnecessary.
213. Payments received on the two debts are deemed to pay the finance charges
first and then the prior debt. When the first debt is deemed to have been paid off in
this manner, the prior security interests are terminated. :For example, suppose a debtor
has, an existing obligation of 300 dollars, which is secured by a purchase-money interest
in a refrigerator. If he then buys a stereo on credit from the same merchant, both
obligations may be secured by both the refrigerator and the stereo. However, when
the payments on both obligations total 300 dollars plus the finance charges, the security
interest in the refrigerator is terminated. For a mild dissenting view regarding the
soundness of this scheme, see Kripke, supra note 46, at 474-75.
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2. Consumer Loans
The general philosophical agreement in the area of security
foterests in credit sales does not exist in the loan field; the WCA,
the MCCA, the UCCC, and the National Commission take widely
variant positions on this subject.
Original AB. I 057 prohibited securing a consumer loan with a
nonpurchase-money security interest in (I) real property, where the
amount :financed is 3,000 dol1ars or less; 214 (2) personal property, the
fair market value of which exceeds one and one-half times the
amount :financed;215 or (3) "household furnishings, appliances [ or]
clothing of the customer and his dependents."216 At first-stage negotiations, the bartks were concerned. about the first two prohibitions.
Initially, and without great difficulty, they convinced consumer representatives that the second iimitation was unworkable and counterproductive. They argued that it would require an appraisal of the
value of the would-be collateral and that the cost of this appraisal
would be passed on to the customer. In addition, the banks maintained. that this restriction would severely affect debt-consolidation
loans, in which the creditor normally relies on all avai1able collateral. Consumer representatives agreed to eliminate the second
restriction chiefly because they believed that consumers often benefit
froIIl debt consolidation loans, 217
The negotiations concerning security interests in real ptoperty
followed a pattern similar to that followed ih the case of sales. '.Because a number of Milwaukee banks were in the practice of making
loans for the construction of residential garages, bank representa•
tives sought a reduction in the loan-size requirement. They pointed
out that if the 3,000-dollar limit remained, banks would rately be
214. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(3)(a). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.416(3)(a),
'the MCCA has retained this restnction, adding the requirement that the credit be
extended "for the purpose of the substantial improvement of the real property."
MoDEL CoNSUMER CREDIT Acr § 2.411(2)(d).
215. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(3)(b). See NATIONAL CONSUJIIER Acr § 2.416(3)(b),
The MCCA has expanded this restriction by making it also applicable to purchasemoney security interests and by adding a prohibition of security interests in "tools of
the trade of the consumer not exceeding a fair market value of five hundred dol•
Jars •.••" MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 2.411(4)(a).
216. A.B. 1057, § 422,416(2). NATIONAL CONSUJIIER Arrr § 2.416(2),
The MCCA has expanded this restriction by prohibiting purchase-money as well ns
nonpurchase-money security interests and by adding "personal effects" to the list.
MoDEL CONSUMER CREDIT Arrr § 2.411(2)(b). These provisions are applicable to all
consumer-credit transactions.
217. For a suggestion that the provision is probably meaningless since few borrowers
have personal property suitable for use as collateral, see Moo, supra note lo, at 453
n.69.
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able to secure thejr loans. Yet, few custoJners would qu<!-1.ify for lq<P.J.s
of the size needed to construct a garage if the loan could p.ot 'be
secured by the realty, Consumer representatives were again :fac;ed
with a line-dra·wing problem .arising from thej.r 'belief that~ debtor's
realty should be substantially improved before he risks the lp~s o~
his home. Unable to establish that a debtor's realty could not be
substantially improved for less than 3,000 dollars, they agreed, at the
end of first-stage negotiations, to reduce the reqqirement to 2,000
dollars.
By far the most influep.tial voice at second-stage negotiatim1s on,
security interests in loans was that of the consumer financ;:e companies. Since the great bulk. of their business consists of cl.irect conl!UJD.er loans, the issue was critical to them. The finance coJnp<J.11-ie,s,
as well as the banks, were still cijssatisfied with the 2,000-doUar- lofl.P.size requirement for sec:urity interests in realty, Both institutjop.s
make loans in tile 1,300- to J,500,dollar range that are :i<;:c:ured by
realty, ap.d tp.ey were :rwt cJ.IP{ious to chap.ge their prnctices, Mother
source of pressure came froJD, the fact that the savings anp. lo,:'!-n
assoc:iations and the banks sought a simile!! reduction ip. th,e c::i.se of
credit sales, In light of their "substantial improvement" philosophy,
consumer representatives would have been hard pressed to jmt~fy
~eating security interests in sales and Joans differently. Cpnsequently, they reluctantly :'!-greed, ::is a result of the :;evere press1,1re
from all sides, tp p,1rt4er redµce the loan-size requireJI!ent tp J,0Q0
dollars. 218
By comparison, the National Commission makes no recommet1~
dation as to restricting real property ,security interests pn lo.c!-Ils,219
while the DCCC restricts seq1rity interests in real property op_ loans
only where the finance charge exceed$ eighteen per cent per year
and the loan is 1,000 dollars or less,220 The rationale for restricting
security interests on loans less severely than those on sales is far from.
clear. However, i~ doubtless depends on how the problem is perceived, Certainly, the sales ap.d loans b1,1sinesses are quite different
from one another, and the most notoriously abusive practices have
occurred in the case of sales. (There is no such thing as a high,-pre:;sure door-to-door lender.) However, the fact that the customer might
lose his home as a result of a relatively small purchase is apparently
seen as a danger from which the c:ons1J,mer should pe protected, That
g1s. See Wisconsiµ. Cqnsumer ,Act ~ 4~2,4i7(3)(b). ·
219. Presumably, the Commission's silence on this issue is a recommendation that
there be no such restrictions.
220. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3.501(3), .510.
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danger hardly seems to be decreased by the fact that the funds used
to make the purchase were obtained from a direct lender or were
obtained at a rate of eighteen per cent or less. Moreover, since direct
lenders rarely take real property security on smaller loans, there is
little likelihood that any important source of credit will be curtailed
as a result of further restrictions. 221 Hence, there seems to be little
justification for failing to restrict the few direct lenders who do engage in this practice.
The second major concern of the consumer finance companies
regarding security interests on loans was the prohibition on taking
household goods. The common practice of Wisconsin finance companies had been to secure many of their consumer loans by taking
an interest in all of the household goods owned by the customer.
Although they admittedly repossessed such collateral only in rare
circumstances, the finance companies believed that taking such security interests significantly increases the debtor's incentive to repay
the obligation. Hence, the prospect of the total unavailability of such
collateral was a matter of great concern.
Consumer advocates were ambivalent, since this is an area where
serious abuses are common, yet the danger of overprotection is particularly great. They strongly believed that special protection should
be provided for those items truly necessary to a minimum standard
of living; 222 since household furnishings and the like rarely have any
significant resale value, they were not considered to be legitimate
collateral. Consumer representatives realized, however, that some
household goods do have significant resale value and saw no reason
why the consumer should not be able to borrow against such property as long as his livelihood was not endangered. Eventually, the two
groups were able to agree on a list of specific household necessities
that were made unavailable to the direct lender unless the proceeds
of the loan were used to purchase the items.223 Notably available
221. One might imagine a hypothetical debtor who is in dire need of 500 dollars
and whose credit rating is such that he can only obtain such a sum by mortgaging his
house. The 'Wisconsin restrictions on security interests on loans would certainly work
to his disadvantage. However, I think this is likely to be a very rare case, and if it
were to occur, the debtor, by putting up his house, could probably borrow 1,000 dollars
and avoid the limitation.
222. Put more paternalistically, the debtor should not be allowed to risk loss of
household necessities in order to obtain loans for the purchase of what is likely to be
less essential property.
223. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.417(3)(c). The list includes clothing, dining
table and chairs, refrigerator, heating stove, cooking stove, radio, beds, bedding, couch
and chairs, cooking utensils, and kitchenware.
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for use as collateral are televisions, stereos, freezers, washers, dryers,
pianos, organs, antiques, boats, outboard motors, snowmobiles, and
cars. Although some consumers may consider their television to be
more important than their dining table, the adamant position taken
by the finance company representatives forced the exclusion of items
not essential to a most basic existence, especially when the item is
likely to have significant resale value.
In retrospect, both consumer and finance company representatives seem content with the accord reached. While the debtor need
not fear sleeping on the floor, the creditor may take a security interest in enough of the debtor's property to provide the psychological
impetus considered so important by the finance companies.224
The National Commission, by way of contrast, apparently does
not consider the use of household items as collateral to be a justifiable practice. Notwit~tanding the heavy creditor reliance on such
security interests in some cases, the Commission recommends that no
creditor be allowed to take a nonpurchase-money security interest in
household goods. Stating simply that the right, in the event of default, to repossess household goods has "far too disruptive an impact
on the family life of the debtor to be in the public interest," the
Commission makes no further distinction between necessities and
nonnecessities. 225
In my opinion, the Commission's position is too simplistic. While
I would perhaps expand the WCA list of necessities, 226 and while it
is not entirely clear what the Commission would include in the category of household goods, it seems to me that the debtor should have
the opportunity to decide how disruptive the loss of his piano or
antique desk would be, and to weigh that risk against the value of a
loan he might otherwise be unable to obtain. Also, the Commission's position is curious in light of its recommendations regarding
realty. Whereas the consumer is not allowed to borrow 500 dollars
against his piano, he can grant a mortgage on his house. Surely the
disruption attendant to a foreclosure action would exceed that resulting from repossession of a piano.
224. One finance company representative told me that he thinks that the items
available to the lender are the ones that the average debtor cares most about and are
likely to provide more psychological impetus than the furniture or pots and pans.
225. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 27.
226. Compare the items classified as necessities in a different context (prejudgment
attachment) by the California supreme court: television sets, refrigerators, stoves, sewing
machines, and furniture of all kinds. Randone v. Appellate Dept. of the Super. Ct.,
5 Cal. 3d 536, 560, 488 P.2d HI, 29, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 725 (1971).
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D. Jl.estricticms on Deficiencies and Volunt4ry Surrender
When the secured creditor repossesses and disposes of collateral,
the sale price is typically well below the outstanding balance of the
account. To the extent that the sal~ price is insufficient to cover the
debt plus allowable costs, the customer normally remains obligated
to the creditor. This obligation is termed a "deficiency," and the
judgment thereon is a "deficiency judgment.'' Great controversy
has ragei:l of late as to whether a~d to what extent deficiencies in the
consumer setting should be restricted. The matter was no less controversial in Wisconsin.
What, then, is ·wrong with allowing the creditor to collect consumer deficiencies? The theory underlying deficiencies is simple and
has a good deal of appeal. The customer has undertaken an obligation that he ought to repay in full. If the proceeds from enforcing
a security interest exceed the amount owed, the creditor must remit
the excess to the debtor. By the same token, if the proceeds do not
satisfy the obligation, the debtor should be required to make up the
difference. The critical flaw in this analysis is that this fifty-fifty
model is a mirage; the deficiency is the only result that in fact occurs.221 Very simply, the amount of the deficiency all too often seems
unjustifiably large in light of the circumstances.2ll8
Suppose, for example, that a debtor borrows 1,200 dollars to buy
a stove, a refrigerator, and a living room set, the debt to be paid off
in two years at a yearly interest rate of eighteen per cent. The initial
balance, including finance charge, would be approximately 1,440
dollars, and the monthly payments, about 60 dollars. After making
payments for eight months, the debtor would have reduced the
balance to about 850 dollars after deducting a HO-dollar rebate for
unearned interest. If the debtor then defaults, repossession would
yield a deficiency of 500 dollars (assuming the resale value of the
used goods to be 400 dollars and repossession and storage costs to be
50 dollars229), This surely would seem onerous to a debtor who has
already paid 480 dollars and has an empty kitchen and living room.
227. In Professor Shuchman's study of eighty-three automobile repossessions in
Connecticut, only one resale price exceeded the creditor's claim (including cost of sale)
against the debtor. Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile
Repossession ar,d Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20, 62-65 (1969).
228. The deficiency judgment reached the zenith of its potential absurdity in Imperial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. City Ct, 1963).
The customer bought an automobile battery for $35.00, paid the dept iiown to SU.'75,
and defaulted. When the dust cleared, he 1vas withQut bat~ery or car aqd faced wiili !l
deficiency of $128.00. See generally Shucpman, Profit on Default: An Archival St~,ly
of Automobile Repossession and Resal~, 22 STAN, L, REv. ~O (1969).
229. This figure is probably conservative, Compare Imperial Discount Corp. v,
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Presuming thc}.t t;h!:l initial sales price, the resale price, and the
costs assessed were a.JI fair, the size of the qeficiency cannot be said
to be the foult of eitp.er the debtor or the creditor. Rather, this
situati,:;>n seems µn£,air pri1mrrily beqmse the creditor received so
little for the ne4rly new gooq.s. 23 1> The unfairness is magnified where
t;he repossessed coJlatera,l ii; sold for less than its fair market value,
as is too often the case.231 If the d~btor priginally paid an inflated
price for the goods, the resale will cancel an even smaller portion
of his obligation.
Tl!ere an: those w4o argue23 2 for a complete return to the com~on law doctrine that the, 6-eq.itor not p~ 4llowed to looi t<;> poth
the debt arn;l the ~ollateral~ b.ut must elect one or ~e other.233 Tliey
apparently recllion that deficiency Judgments 11re generally so oppressive that they i,hould not ]:Je pen:p.itteq. regardless of any advers~
impact on costs or credit ayailabiUty that might result from their
prohibition, However, this approacp. ignores the ppssibility that c;ollecting deficiep._cies migqt in sm:p.e cases be reasonab\e. If so, the CQ!it
of eliminating those deficiencies should not be borne by t.µe paying
customer.
I should npte that the complete elimjnµ,tioI1 of deµciencies makes
sense if the over-all creditor succei,s i:q. c91lecting deficiencies is min,
imal. In that cc}.Se creditor -,resi5tap.ce to eliminating deficiencies is
jJ.Jst much ado a,boµt p.othing, anq e~ort§ to gefip.e intricate limitations woiild not be worthwhile. Hq\vever, based on the vigorous
creditor opposition to restrictions on deficiencie,s, ap.d on my own
edectic experience,234 I suspect that this is not the case. Although no
qefj.nitive infon:p.11tipn is av<1-ilable,23 !i this suspicion is bolstered somewhat by Professor Shµchman. His excellent stµqy of automobile
deficiency judgments in Connectictit suggests that in over half of the
deficiency judgments taken the creditor appears to collect,286 Of
Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. City Ct. 1963), where costs for re•
pogse!jsion, storage, and s11Ie of an autolj'.lQbile were 150 dollars.
230. Adding to the disillusionment of at least some debtors is the fact that over
21> per cent of the payments made by the debtor weq.t to pay finance charges.
231. See text accompanying nqtes 261-63 infra.
23ll. See, e.g., Clark, ~upra note 14, at 3~9,
233, See 2 G-. GILMORE, supra note 119, at 1185-88.
234. In information supplied by nine Wisconsin banks, the f!Sti~ated pre-WC!\
success in collecµng deficiencies ranged from 10 to 50 per cent, wjtb. most 'esti~at~
falling into the 15 to 20 per cent range.
235. Perhaps some of the National Conp:nissioi;i studies will be helpful.
236. Shuchmaµ 1 ~upra note 2~8, ~t 38.
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course, most of the time no deficiency judgment is sought,237 either
because it is not necessary or because it is not worthwhile.
The two reforms generally proposed are that deficiencies on
smaller obligations be prohibited and that the method of calculating
deficiencies be altered. A third, and very volatile, issue is whether
deficiencies arising from credit sales should be treated differently
from those arising from consumer loans.
I. Elimination of Deficiencies on Smaller Obligations

Why eliminate deficiencies on smaller obligations?238 Where the
value of the collateral is very small the objective is clear: If the cost
of repossession, storage, and disposal is comparable to the sale price
of the collateral, the repossession will not reduce the debt significantly.239 As long as the costs do not exceed the resale price, the
creditor loses nothing, but the loss to the debtor may be significant.
Although the creditor stands to gain little through repossession, he
has a powerful coercive tool. Hence, where collateral has little resale value, repossession is primarily a means for harassment. 240
Certainly, the law should not condone such conduct.
The water muddies, however, as the size of the obligations in
which a deficiency is denied becomes larger. If the collateral is sold
for its actual value and if its value is not eaten up by the costs, why
should the creditor be forced to choose between the collateral and
a money judgment? The answer to this question turns on a judgment regarding who should absorb the loss when the resale value
of the goods is substantially less than the original purchase price. 241
If the burden of deficiencies is shifted to the creditor, the primary impact will probably be on the motor vehicle market. The
vast majority of repossessions take place in this market because mo237. The National Commission study of deficiency suits in the District of Columbia
showed that "there were only two deficiency suits for every nine repossessions." John•
son, supra note 122, at 43.
238. Advocates of this action are not entirely in accord on the rationale for elimi•
nating such deficiencies. See Kripke, supra note 46, at 477.
239. See Jordan &: Warren, supra note 46, at 441. For e.xample, if the cost of re•
possessing, storing, and disposing of the debtor's refrigerator is 50 dollars and its
sale brings only 75 dollars, the debt is reduced by only 25 dollars, and the debtor has
lost his refrigerator. That the debtor could theoretically avoid this result by selling
the collateral himself is no answer. First, the creditor would probably try to prevent
the debtor from disposing of the collateral, and, second, as a practical matter, debtors
in distress rarely take advantage of the steps available to them. See Shuchman, supra
note 228, at 36-38 (74 of the 78 deficiency judgments studied were obtained by default),
240. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 7, at 297.
241. See Kripke, supra note 46, at 478. Of course, if the value of the goods has not
dropped substantially, the election subjects the creditor to little hardship.
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tor vehicles are the only common consumer personalty with any appreciable resale value. Professor Shuchman's study of eighty-three
automobile deficiency suits showed that the average deficiency was
approximately 600 dollars.242 If his figures are typical of deficiencies
where no suit is filed, and if creditors succeed in collecting fifteen
per cent of their deficiencies,243 the complete prohibition of deficiencies could result in losses of roughly 90 dollars per repossession.
In order to reduce these losses, creditors could either avert deficiencies to the extent possible or increase interest rates and retail
prices. But brisk competition between creditors and retailers in most
states for the automobile dollar would tend to make price and rate
increases a secondary creditor response. Instead, creditors would
probably restrict the availability of credit to the higher risk customer. However, since even careful screening will never completely
eliminate the need for deficiencies,244 price and rat~ increases are
certainly possible.
If this analysis is correct, the impact of restricting deficiencies
will be visited primarily on the high-risk automobile purchaser. He
will be required to make a down payment sufficient to cover the
initial depreciation, to buy a cheaper car, or, in markets where no
down payment is required, to forgo the purchase entirely. This result is appealing in that the class of consumers sought to be protected
-that is, the class most likely to default-is also the class that pays
for most of the protection. On closer analysis, however, this is still
a case of one person paying for the protection of another. Since no
creditor can identify with certainty who will and who will not default, he must simply restrict credit to the customers that he considers most marginal. Within that group, some would have defaulted
and some would not. To those customers who would othenvise have
defaulted but do not because they bought a cheaper car, and to those
who still default but without the possibility of a deficiency, the
added protection is a boon. The price of that protection has been
paid by the customer who would not have defaulted, but whose
credit was restricted.
How can this benefit be weighed against this burden? With
242. The average net total claim was 1,416 dollars, and the average first resale
price was 806 dollars. This results in an average deficiency of 610 dollars. Shuchman,
supra note 228, at 62-65.
243. See note 234 supra.
244. The most common causes of default are loss of job, overextension, illness, and
family break-up. COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 23, at 43. Most of these cannot be
predicted at the time credit is extended.
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certainty, it CiUlnQt; yet I am astonished at how many consumer
a,cl.vo(;ates seem so certain that deficiencies should be restricted.
Neye~:theless1 with some hesitation, J side with them for a number
of reasops.
First, defo::iencies are a tremendous burden on the individualnot only on the individual who pays, but on the individual who doi::s
I1Qt. The burden is not only financi<!l; it is also emotional. Defi<;iencies nearly alw4ys seem unduly large to the customer; it is no
help to tell him that the charges and resale price were legitimate.
To be deluged for months by letters and phone calls demanding the
payment Qf what seems to be an unjust debt is a severe drain,
Secol}d, the argument, commonly made by creditors, that the
party at fault should bear the burden is not appropriate. In most
cases, the concept of fault has no place in a discussion of consumer
default because the causes of default are largely out of the debtor's
control.245
If deficiencies on smaller obligations are to be eliminated, two
basic issues must be resolved: first, the obligation size below which
deficiencies may not be collected, and second, whether to base this
cutoff point on the size of the initial obligation or on the size of the
obligation at the time of the default, A thircl issue, which was considered briefly in Wisconsin, is whether special consideration should
be given to the portion of the original obligation that has been paid
<1-t the time of default.
Original AB. I 057 provided that where the creditor repossesses,
the customer is liable for the outstmding balance only if (a) the unpaid balance at the time of defaqlt is 2,000 dollars or more, and (b)
the customer h<!,s paid less than one third of the deferred payment
pric~.246 Since these provisions significantly affect automobile financing, the negotiatio;ns between bank and consumer representatives were arduous. In contrast, national retailers, who rarely
repossess, were largely unconcerned.
!i?45, The only common reason for default that is substantially within the debtor's
control is overextension. See note 244 supra. However, this is also within the control
of the creditor. Default due to overextension works to the detriment of everybody, yet
its frequency indicates that neither debtors nor creditors have paid sufficient attention
to the problem. Of course, to force creditors to be more concerned about overextension
is to take away, to some extent, the debtor's ability to make his own decisions as to
what he can and cannot afford, This is regrettaJ>le, but clearly too many debtors have
beep. m_aking poor decisions. In my view, some additional concern on the part of tl).e
credit community is not unwarranted.
246. A.B. 1057, § 425.211. The corresponding provision of the NCA (section 5,211)
did not include th~ reqtJirement that le~ than one third of the obligation have been
p!lid, +he l'),!CCA would simply eliminate:: deficiencjcs altogether. See MoDEL CoN~Ul.Jf:R
CREDIT

Acr § 7.208(1).
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According to the draftsmen of the NCA, the "major concern"
of the legitimate creditor is the consumer who defaults on an early
payment, leaving used collateral and a substantial unpaid balance,247
Apparently1 the elimination of deficiencies where more than one
third of the amount financed is paid reflected this concern. While
creditor representatives were ·willing to discuss restrictions on creditors in areas of great consumer interest1 the converse position, that
creditor remedies be available only in areas of "major creditor concern/' was totally unacceptable and even posed a threat to future
negotiations. In addition, the banks argued that it would be irrational and arbitrary to allow a debtor to escape liability for a deficiency regardless of the obligation size once he has paid one third
of the obligation. Consumer representatives relented rather quickly.
The true clash came on the questions of obligation size and cutoff point. In the hypothetical case discussed at the beginning of this
section, the original amount financed was 1,200 dollars, and the
balance, excluding interest, at the time of default was 850 dollars.
If deficiencies were prohibited only where the original obligation
was 1,000 dollars or less, the creditor would be allowed to collect
this deficiency. However, if deficiencies were prohibited where the
obligation at the time of default was 1,000 dollars or less, no deficiency would be allowed.
The banks were extremely unhappy that the cutoff under Original A.B. 1057 was based on the outstanding obligation at the time
of default. All consumer accounts could fall within the provision,
and on large accounts the creditor would not know whether he
would be put to an election until the time of default. In addition,
the banks vigorously insisted that the 2,000-dollar cutoff be reduced.
They argued that forcing an election on accounts of that size went
far beyond what was needed in light of the evil to be remedied.
Moreover, and more important to the outcome of the negotiations,
they took the position that too many of their accounts would be
affected and that a reduction was essential if they were to support
the bill.
Consumer representatives, on the other hand, disliked the prospect of reducing the cutoff size; yet, for practical reasons, they were
willing to accede. However, they insisted on basing the cutoff on the
balance at the time of default, as provided in the original bill. One
of the most severe consumer criticisms of the DCCC had been its
use of the original obligation size as the point of reference. Since the
247. See

NAnONAI. CONSUMER

Ac::r

§
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1.

62

ii!ichigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:1

seller and the creditor can combine ,to control the cash price, the
trade-in allowance, and finance and other charges,248 consumer representatives felt that the availability of a deficiency gave creditors
too much control. Further, the banks' complaints about the uncertainty created by the provision did not convince the consumer
representatives.
At the end of first-stage negotiations, a compromise was achieved,
based, not on rational calculation, but on political necessity. The
obligation-size cutoff was reduced to 1,500 dollars, and the basis for
its determination remained the size of the obligation at the time of
default. In addition, consumer representatives willingly agreed to
add a provision making the customer liable in damages for wrongfully damaging or hiding the collateral.249
Second-stage negotiations yielded no change. However, this was
one area in which the automobile finance companies influenced the
WCA. On the floor of the Wisconsin senate they pushed through
an amendment, which further reduced the obligation-size cutoff from
1,500 dollars to 1,000 dollars. 250 The members of the consumercredit coalition had agreed to stand behind the negotiated bill and
oppose all amendments regardless of their individual interests. This
was the only proposed amendment that they could not stop. One of
the negotiators told me that he thought that the senate was simply
"itching" to approve at least one amendment, and this turned out
to be it.251
If Professor Shuchman's data are typical of Wisconsin, the WCA
will prohibit deficiencies on only thirty-eight per cent of the repossessions, and the average deficiency on these will be about two thirds
of the over-all average deficiency.252 Hence, Wisconsin creditors will
lose only about twenty-five per cent of their pre-WCA deficiency
recovery. The rough loss estimation of ninety dollars per repossession cited above for the entire denial of deficiencies then becomes
twenty-two dollars.
In contrast to the WCA, both the UCCC and the UCCC Redraft
eliminate deficiencies where the original cash price of the goods
248. See Shuchman, supra note 228, at 47.
249. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(5).
250. The amendment as proposed would also have changed the cutoff basis to the
initial sale price. However, this was averted by a last minute amendment to the
amendment offered by one of the coalition members.
251. Conversation with John Holbrook, Milwaukee, February 1973.
252. Assuming that repossession costs in the cases studied by Shuchman were 100
dollars per car, the WCA would have denied deficiencies on 32 of the 83 claims
studied. See Shuchman, supra note 228, at 62-65; Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(2),
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repossessed is 1,000 dollars or less.258 This provision will, of course,
preclude deficiencies in far fewer repossessions254 than the WCA and
will also allow the creditor to determine the availability of a deficiency in many cases. The intent of the UCCC Special Committee
is apparently to protect debtors only in those cases in which the
value of the collateral at the time of default is quite small and not to
shift much of the burden of depreciation to the creditor. 255
The National Commission, on the other hand, had no qualms
about shifting this burden to the creditor. The Commission recommends eliminating deficiencies where the purchase, in sales, or the
amount financed, in loans, is 1,765 dollars or less.256 Despite the
probability that such a restriction will increase rates and reduce
credit availability, the Commission believes that "implementation
of that recommendation would afford consumers protection in areas
particularly susceptible of abuse," that is, in repossessions of household goods and used cars.267
Regarding household goods, the Commission simply believes
that too great a personal hardship would be caused if the creditor
is allowed both the collateral and the deficiency.258 Although this
does not seem to me to be a clear abuse, at least where the costs
assessed are reasonable and a fair price is obtained for the collateral,
the Commission believes that the burden created by the inevitably
poor resale value of household goods ought to be spread throughout
the community. I agree, chiefly because repossessions of household
goods are rare and the impact of the limitation should be slight.
253. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(2); UNIFORM CONSUll!ER CREDIT
CODE § 5.103(2) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). The Redraft changes the cutoff
basis from "cash price" to "cash sale price." However, the impact of this change
should not be great since there is no separate definition for "cash sale price," and
the definition of "cash price" remains substantially the same. Compare UNIFORM
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.110 with UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CoDE § 1.301 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). In an earlier draft, the UCCC based the cutoff on the
amount financed. UNIFORM CONSUll!ER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(1) (Working Draft No. 6,
1967). This would have precluded deficiencies in more transactions than the present
sale price formulation with which the Special Committee appears content. A still earlier
draft, however, drew the line where the obligation at the time of repossession was
500 dollars or less, which would probably have permitted more deficiencies but would
have eliminated creditor control. See Jordan &: '\Varren, A Proposed Uniform Code
for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. &: COMM. L. REv. 441, 457-58 (1967).
254. Of the eighty-three cases studied by Professor Shuchman, deficiencies would
have been prohibited in thirteen under the UCCC. Shuchman, supra note 228, at 62-65.
255. See Jordan &: Warren, supra note 46, at 441 (emphasizing situations in which
costs eat up the value of the collateral); Moo, supra note 15, at 452 (emphasizing the
use of the threat of repossessing low-value collateral to coerce payment).
256. COMMISSION R.El>ORT, supra note 23, at 29.
257. Id. at 30.
258. Id. at 31.

Michigan Law Review

64

[Vol. '12:1

The Commission arrived at the figure of 1,765 dollars by identi•
fying the point at which the used- and new-car markets are not in
competition. Using a study of deficiencies in Washington, D.C., the
Commission found abuses "peculiar to the used car market,''2 uo and
calculated the cutoff figure accordingly. Since, at this ·writing, the
studies underlying the Commission Report are not available, it is
difficult to evaluate this conclusion.
2.

Calculation of Deficiencies

The scuttlebutt has long been that repossessed cars are often sold
for less than they appear to be worth. The reason, it is said, is that
"repossessed cars are usually of below-average quality because a consumer is not motivated to invest in the maintenance of an asset he
may shortly lose," and there is occasional "spite damage."280 Professor Shuchman's study indicates that repossessed cars are indeed
usually sold at prices well below their apparent wholesale value, but
not because they are worth less than wholesale.281 He suggests,
rather, that the low return on repossessed cars results from the
economics of the present system, which provide "no incentive for
the financer and little incentive for the dealer to resell the repossessed
car at the highest price obtainable."262 Rather, a pervasive system of
backscratching exists among the majority of the automobile sales
financers and dealers.263 Clearly, to the extent consumers pay in deficiencies the differential between their cars' actual value and the
resale price, the automobile sale-finance community receives added
income. Equally clearly, those funds belong in consumer pockets.
In response to this problem, Original A.B. 1057 provided that the
computation of the deficiency was to be based on the fair market
value at the time of sale rather than the actual sale price of the
259. Id. at 30,31.
260. Johnson, supra note 122, at 15.
261, Shuchman used the Redbook, published by the National Automotive Publishers, to estimate the true value of repossessed cars. The Redbook is generally relied
upon for accurate retail and wholesale automobile prices. See Shuchman, supra note
228, at 27 n.28. His data showed that the price of the first resale of repossessed cars
(from creditor to retailer) averaged only 71 per cent of Redbook wholesale. By comparison, where dealers buy and sell at weekly wholesale auctions, he found that the
average price is 93 per cent of Redbook wholesale. However, since the second resale
of repossessed cars (dealer to consumer) averaged 92 per cent of Redbook retail, the
extremely low first resale price cannot be attributed to the cars' poor condition. In
addition, examination of about 20 repossessed cars revealed that all could be driven
and all appeared in normal condition. Only two out of 150 cars were "junked" after
repossession. Id. at 31-33.
262. Id. at 26.
263. Id. at 37-38.
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collateral; published trade estimates of retail values were presumed
to be fair market value.264 The banks were willing to accept the
elimination of the actual-sale-price doctrine but strongly objected to
the presumption of retail value. They argued that since they are not
in the business of selling automobiles, they could never dispose of
automobiles at that price. Nevertheless~ consumer representatives
held fast. The bill submitted to the legislature retained the presumption. However, the presumption did not survive. The legislature accepted an amendment that deleted it. Thus, the dete:rmination of
fair market value is left entirely to the Wisconsin courts.265
Surely it is unrealistic to expect creditors to become retail automobile sellers, but it does seem entirely reasonable to expect the
creditor to obtain a price comparable to the wholesale auction price.
Professor Shuchman's data show that at the time of repossession the
average Redhook retail value is 108 per cent .of the average net total
claim, and the average Redhook wholesale value is 77 per cent of
the average claim.266 To calculate deficiencies based on Redhook
retail figures would be tantamount, on the average, to denying
a deficiency. Since the car is probably worth only 77 per cent of the
claim to the creditor, a rule using retail value actually places the
entire burden of motor vehicle depreciation on the creditor. It
seems to me that, where this is the desired result, the legislature
ought to disclose its purpose. The burden should be given to the
creditor either in the form of a complete denial of deficiencies or not
at all. Where deficiencies are available, the creditor should have to
deduct only the price he can reasonably expect to obtain-the fair
market wholesale value of the goods.
Unlike the WCA, the National Commission does not recommend
a method of calculating deficiencies. Presumably, the Commission
would solve the problem, at least in the used car market, by simply
denying deficiencies altogether. However, a great number of cars
are sold for prices in excess of 1,765 dollars, and I see no reason why,
when these cars are repossessed, .consumers should receive credit for
less than fair market wholesale value.

3. Special Treatment for Loans
The deficiency restrictions in Original A.B. 1057 applied to all
consumer-credit transactions, 267 whereas the UCCC restrictions ap264.
265.
266.
267.

A.B. 1057, § 425.212. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Am: § 5.212.
See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.210.
Shuchman, supra note 228, at 32-33.
A.B. 1057, § 425.212. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Aar: § 5.212.
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ply only to credit sales.268 While the UCCC Redraft includes interlocking loans 269 in its restrictions,270 the UCCC Special Committee
otherwise adheres to its initial decision not to restrict deficiencies on
loans. The National Commission, however, recommends only a
minor distinction between sales and loans on the deficiency issue.211
Although I have found no published explanation of the rationales underlying these widely variant approaches, it is evident that
the solution again turns on one's perception of the problem.
Examples of the potential oppressiveness of deficiencies always seem
to involve the purchase of an item that is later repossessed. In contrast, when a direct lender forecloses on his nonpurchase-money
~ecurity interest in all the debtor's home furnishings in order to reduce the debt by twenty-five dollars it is usually seen as an abusive
taking of a security interest, rather than as a deficiency problem.212
hguably, then, it makes some sense to restrict deficiencies only in
credit sales. Further, since a lender is generally permitted to take as
much security as the debtor is willing to put up, 213 restricting deficiencies in loans would simply encourage, to the extent it is
available, the taking of more security than the lender would ordinarily require-hardly a desirable result from the consumer viewpoint.
,On the other hand, if the debtor is to be relieved of the burden
of the depreciation of consumer goods, whether they be cars, household items, or other goods, why should the mechanism by which
credit is extended be relevant? Though the direct lender is not as
involved in the sale as the indirect lender or the seller, the customer
, is no less disillusioned when the direct lender repossesses than when
the seller does. Further, if the object of restricting deficiencies is to
remedy the problem of the less-than-actual-value sale, it is not
realistic to expect a bank, which may engage in both direct and in268. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(1),
269. For a discussion of the alternative definitions of "interlocking loans," see text
accompanying notes 70-103 supra.
270. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 5.103(1) (Working Redraft No. 4, 19i2),
271. CoMMISSioN REPORT, supra note 23, at 29. Slightly different treatment is recom•
mended in the definition of the deficiency cutoff basis. For loans, no deficiency would
be permitted if the amount financed is 1,765 dollars or less, whereas on credit sales, an
original sales price of 1,765 dollars or less precludes a deficiency. If the customer makes
a sufficiently large down payment in a credit sale of goods in e.xcess of 1,765 dollars,
the seller could escape these restrictions while extending credit in an amount less than
1,765 dollars. Consequently, deficiencies in consumer loan cases are somewhat more
severely restricted than are those in credit sales.
272. See text accompanying notes 222-24 supra.
273. See text between notes 221-22 supra.
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direct financing, to dispose of one repossessed good any differently
from another merely on the basis of the way in which its purchase
was financed. 274
In Wisconsin, the issue was first raised by the banks. It had been
their practice to make debt consolidation loans, some portion of
which was normally secured. However, debtors who need these loans
rarely own sufficient property to cover the entire loan. Consequently, they actually are made partly in reliance on collateral and
partly in reliance on the debtor's creditworthiness. Bank representatives argued that such loans are beneficial to consumers and that
their availability would be curtailed by the elimination of deficiencies with regard to them.
Very basically, consumer representatives believed that, since the
majority of deficiencies go uncollected, very little consumer credit,
except for cars, is truly collateral-based. They were largely unconvinced by creditor projections of decreased credit-availability. Therefore, as of the end of the first-stage negotiations, they were unwilling
to create any exception for loans. But the banks were not ready to
give up.
At the second stage, the consumer finance companies, the majority of whose business is direct loans, were greatly concerned by the
prospect of loan restrictions resulting from abuses normally thought
to arise out of credit sales. They vehemently insisted that consumer
representatives identify their exact objectives in limiting deficiencies.
Consumer representatives conceded that their primary concernthat is, the most glaring area of abuse-was the sale of repossessed
collateral at a price below its actual value, especially when the sale
is between financers and retailers who have a continuing arrangement. Finance company representatives argued that such practices
did not occur in the loan industry; in the rare circumstance where
finance companies repossess they have every reason to seek the maximum price for the collateral. Restricting deficiencies on loans would
only force finance companies to be more conservative in their lending policies with no correlative benefit to the consumer.
Under the combined pressure exerted by the banks and the finance companies, and in light of what they saw as their primary
objectives, consumer representatives agreed, out of political necessity,
to exempt noninterlocking loans from the WCA deficiency restrictions.275
274. Of course, as suggested above, this problem can be largely overcome by calculating deficiencies using fair market wholesale value.
275. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(1).
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This decision was clearly dictated by the political realities of the
situation. Thus, there is no reason to expect it to be judicious, which,
in my opinion, it is not. I agree that there is good reason for affording special treatment to some loans, but if deficiencies are to be restricted in credit sales, only the exemption of nonpurchase-money
loans makes any sense. The fact that the direct lender, in making a
purchase-money loan, may be less closely tied to the sale than the
indirect lender does not seem to be significant. The rationale for
restricting deficiencies is not that the lender is somehow culpable,
but, simply as a matter of policy, that he seems better able to bear the
burden of depreciation. In that respect the purchase-money lender
and the sales financer are identical.
In comparison, nonpurchase-money collateral loans seem quite
different. Where the debtor borrows against collateral he already
owns, there is none of the rapid depreciation normally attendant to
signing on the dotted line. The debtor is more likely to see the value
of the collateral as being the amount that he could sell it for-which
is always the creditor viewpoint-than the amount he paid for it~
which, I suspect, is the debtor's view at the time of purchase. On
repossession there is no burden of substantial depreciation to be
allocated, and the amount of the deficiency does not appear unreasonably large.276 In my opinion, special treatment of nonpurchase-money loans is perfectly rational,277 and probably advisable.
Otherwise, the decreased availability of such collateralized loans
is likely to be balanced by only minimal consumer benefit.
There is at least one notable problem in prohibiting deficiencies
only on purchase-money loans. It is common for lenders to make
multipurpose loans where the proceeds are used partly to purchase
goods and partly to consolidate prior debts, pay taxes, or finance a
vacation. It is thus necessary to devise a scheme that denies a deficiency only with regard to the portion of the loan that went toward
the purchase. Although some difficulty is unavoidable, the problem
is not insurmountable.
While many satisfactory schemes might be devised, one method
of allocation is to treat this situation in the way that security in276. As suggested above, this apparent unreasonableness is the core of the deficiency
problem. Another factor vitiating the debtor's disillusionment is that, whereas in a
credit sale the debtor receives goods on credit, in a nonpurchase-money loan, ltc
receives money on credit. Consequently, in a loan transaction, the debtor is more likely
to know that the creditor expects the debt to be repaid and that giving up the col•
lateral may not be sufficient.
277. The Wisconsin banks were chiefly concerned about debt-consolidation loans.
Naturally, when consumer representatives agreed to exclude loans completely, the
banks were delighted.
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terests in add-on sales are tteated.278 For example, where a portion
of the proceeds from a multipurpose loan is used to purchase goods
in which a security interest is taken, the payments on the obligation
would be deemed to be first applied to pay off that portion of the
loan.279 If the goods are repossessed before that portion is deemed to
be paid off and, in keeping with the WCA formulation, if the outstanding balance on that portion is 1,000 dollars or less, the entire
obligation is reduced by the amount of that balance. That is, the
creditor forfeits the difference between the balance on the purchasemoney portion of the loan and the sale price of the repossessed collateral. This method treats the loan as two separate loans-one
purchase-money loan and one nonpurchase-money loan. It would
also be necessary to prohibit foreclosure on any nonpurchase-money
security interests in satisfaction of the purchase-money part of the
debt. To the extent that proceeds of the sale of such collateral exceeded the nonpurchase-money portion of the obligation, a rebate
would be due the customer.
A final bothersome point with this method of allocation is the
treatment of the security interest in goods that are deemed to be paid
off. Termination of the security interest will disappoint the creditor,
who is accustomed to relying on the security for the duration of the
entire loan. Further, he could eliminate the problem by advancing
the purchase money on Monday and then advancing the remainder
on Wednesday, taking a second, nonpurchase-money security interest in the newly purchased item. Presumably, paying off the
purchase-money loan would have no effect on the second security
interest. Such loan-splitting gyrations should not be encouraged.280
Accordingly, I would be inclined, in keeping with the WCA
restrictions on security interests,281 to provide for the termination
278. See text accompanying notes 212-13 supra.
279, Of course, it would be possible, as suggested by Professor Kripke, to deem
payments to be applied to tbis portion of the debt ratably in the ratio that this portion
bears to the entire obligation. K.ripke, supra note 46, at 474-75. This would work to
the detriment of the creditor in that the possibility of being forced to an election
would exist through the entire term of the loan. However, if the security interest in
the goods terminates as that portion of the loan is deemed to be paid off, such a
payment allocation would work to the detriment of the customer since the security
interest would not terminate until the entire obligation was paid.
280. Because of the split rate provisions (18 per cent on the first 500 dollars, 12 per
cent on the excess), the WCA explicitly prohibits loan splitting for the purpose of
obtaining a higher rate. Wisconsin Consumer Act§ 422.414. The creditor could avoid a
violation here by charging only 12 per cent on the second loan. Clearly, however,
encouraging the creditor to double his paperwork serves only to increase complexity
and costs.
281, See text accompanying notes 222-23 supra.
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when deemed paid of security interests in those household necessities in which no nonpurchase-money security interest can be taken
and to allow the continuation of security interests in other property.
Consequently, if the property is the type in which a nonpurchasemoney security interest may be taken, an election to repossess would
be required only until the property is deemed paid for, whereupon
the property remains available as security for the rionpurchase-money
portion of the loan.
4. Voluntary Surrender
Original A.B. 1057 provided, notwithstanding any waiver by the
creditor of his security interest, that the customer had the right at
any time voluntarily to surrender the collateral to the creditor, the
effect of such surrender being the equivalent of repossession. 282 The
creditor would thus be denied a deficiency if the outstanding balance
at the time of surrender was below the deficiency cutoff point. This,
in effect, gave the customer the power to make the creditor's election
for him.283 The Wisconsin consumer representatives never intended
to force creditors into such a clearly inequitable position and they
agreed willingly to redraft the section.
Those who did the redrafting intended the provisions on enforcement of security interests to work generally as follows: The
creditor would always be free to request the collateral. Having made
his election, upon the return of the collateral the limitations on deficiencies would apply. However, if the customer surrendered with
neither solicitation nor suggestion by the secured party-that is, if
there was a so-called "voluntary surrender"-no deficiency limitations would apply.284 In effect, the provisions were intended to give
the customer the right to avail himself of the creditor's means for
disposition of collateral, while leaving the election between the debt
and the collateral to the creditor. Although the draftsmen may not
have achieved this objective,285 their reasoning was sound, and their
objective, I think, correct.
·
282.
283.
284.
46 Wis.
285.

A.B. 1057, § 425.205. See NATIONAL CONSUMER. Ac:r § 5.205.
See Moo, supra note 15, at 453.
Holbrook &: Bugge, Creditor's Responsibilities and Duties Under the WCA,
BAR BuL., Feb. 1973, at 37, 45.

Defining in terms of objective behavior the point at which the creditor has
made the subjective election to resort to collateral proved quite difficult. The result
was the following: "The surrender of collateral by a customer is not a voluntary
surrender if it is made pursuant to a request or demand by the [creditor] for the sur•
render of the collateral, or if it is made pursuant to a threat, statement or notice by
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The Commission Report does not touch upon the treatment of
surrender; the UCCC and the UCCC Redraft take a different tack.
By denying deficiencies only where the creditor repossesses or "voluntarily accepts surrender,"286 the UCCC presumably allows a
creditor to avoid a forced election by refusing to accept suriender.287
Hence, under the UCCC the debtor cannot avail himself
the
creditor's means of disposing of collateral. Although this does not
appear to be a critical difference, the Wisconsin approach seems
preferable. Occasionally an overburdened customer simply deposits
the collateral on the creditor's doorstep. In such cases, the creditor
should be encouraged to dispose of the collateral without having to
refuse surrender in order to avoid losing his right to deficiency.

of

a

IV.

SUMMARY: WHAT HAPPENED IN WISCONSIN AND WHAT

DoES lT

MEAN FOR THE REST OF THE COUNTRY?

We have seen, in the context of some specific issu~s, t;he manner
in which the negotiation and drafting of the WCA proceeded and the
results of those efforts. We may now look more closely at the various
factors that contributed to the creation of the WCA. An understanding of these factors may be helpful in predicting what to ,expect in
other states.
I\

the [creditor] that the [creditor] intends to take possession of the collateral." Wisconsin
Consumer Act § 425.204(3).
..
Unfortunately, the "request or demand" formulation leaves open the question of
what happens where the creditor simply notifies the debtor of his right to surrender.
However, the administrator has cleared up ~is uncertainty. The creditor may ,notify
the debtor of his right voluntarily to surrender without fear that such notification will
amount to an election. WIS • .ADMIN. CODE, BANKING § 80.69' (1973).
'
To add to the initial uncertainty, the automobile-finance-company-sponsored amendment, which reduced the deficiency cutoff point to 1,000 dollars, see text accompanying
note 251 supra, was very poorly drafted. It left Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(2)
to read that the customer is not liable for the deficiency "[i]f the merchant repossesses
or accepts voluntary surrender ••.•" This was certainly not the intent of anybody,
including the sponsors of the amendment. The result is this: Where a customer voluntarily surrenders, section 425.209(2) eliminates customer liability, for the deficiency and
section 425.204(2) makes the customer liable for the deficiency. To add to the confusion,
the "accepts voluntary surrender" language of section 425.209(2) implies that a creditor
may refuse to accept voluntary surrender, whereas section. 425.204(2) guarantees the
customer the right so to surrender collateral. Clearly, the Wisconsin legislature hllS, its
work cut out.
'·
286. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(2); UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§§ 5.103(2)-(4) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). Perhaps the draftsmen of the amendment
discussed in note 285 supra intended to use this UCCC language. If so, the seemingly
innocent transposition of ·"voluntarily accepts surrender" to "accepts voluntary surrender" caused a surprising amount of excitement and confusion. See note 285 supra.
287. The MCCA appears to have adopted this approach. The consumer is permitted
to "offer to voluntarily surrender" the collateral, and the creditor is precluded from
seeking judgment on the obligation if he "elects to accept the surrender." MODEL
CONSUllmR CREDIT Ac:r § 7.203(1).
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A. Significant Factors Influencing the Creation of the WCA
Recall the setting in which the WCA came into being. In the
summer of 1971, the Wisconsin banks, retail merchants, and consumer .finance companies were all working toward the passage of
special interest legislation. At the time, Original A.B. I 057 was
sitting in the Wisconsin legislature with little likelihood of passage.
By March 1972, the WCA had been negotiated, drafted, and
pt!Ssed. The critical factors were (1) the initial decision on the part of
consumer forces to stop opposing rate increases in exchange for
comprehensive consumer protection, (2) the forthright action taken
by Governor Lucey, (3) the split in the credit community, (4) the
unquestioned authority of the consumer negotiators to represent all
consumer groups, (5) the personalities of the parties, (6) the fact that
the framework of the negotiations was Original A.B. 1057, (7) the
information upon which negotiators based their decisions, (8) the
disparity in the resources available to consumer and creditor representatives, and (9) the nonparticipation of the automobile finance
companies.
I. The Decision To Trade Rate Increases for Other Benefits

The paramount policy decision made by consumer advocates in
entering into a coalition with creditors was that allowing increases in
interest rates would be a worthwhile exchange for comprehet1sive
consumer-credit protection. This decision, in my opinion, can
neither be criticized nor applauded with any certainty because it
requires the answer to an unanswerable question: To what extent
should the paying consumer subsidize the protection of the nonpaying consumer? The consumer who has a secure source of income,
maintains a sensible amount of debt, makes his payments on time,
and never has tremble qualifying for credit is not greatly in need 0£
protection. Granted, some of the protections of the WCA, such as
disclosure requirements, the elimination of financer immunity :from
claims against sellers, regulation of consumer-approval transactions,
and advertising restrictions, aid all consumers. However, most of the
protections of the WCA, especially those with the greatest potential
cost impact, apply to the consumer who has trouble meeting his
payments. To the extent that his rates are increased, the paying
consumer is bearing the cost of protections primarily intended for
the benefit of others,
While the over-all question is indeed unanswerable, I think that
at least a partial answer may be attempted: Regardles5 of the cost im•
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pact, no creditor should be allowed to engage in practices that are
patently unfair and oppressive. For example, even though the prohibition will increase costs (or reduce profits), no creditor should be
allowed to sell repossessed collateral for less than its actual value
and then pursue a deficiency on the basis of the sale price. Further
examples of such egregious abuses are false advertising and oppressive collection practices. Beyond these fairly obvious instances,
however, certainty evaporates.
Nevertheless, the decision in Wisconsin was not a difficult one
for consumers because rate increases in Wisconsin were, in my opinion, inevitable. If national averages can be validly compared, 1971
rates in Wisconsin were low. At the twelve per cent rate, the profitability of bank and retailer revolving-credit plans was marginal, and
these groups were moving quickly for relief. Moreover, the finance
companies had already convinced the legislature that they needed an
increase. It seems doubtful that consumers would have been able to
resist these forces permanently. By allowing the inevitable to occur,
consumer forces were able to obtain comprehensive protection at a
very small cost. Of course, i£ consumer forces had staunchly opposed
the creditor legislation, the rates might have increased to only
fifteen, rather than eighteen, per cent. However, the decision made
in Wisconsin can hardly be criticized on the basis of such speculation.

2. The Role of the Governor
Probably none of the factors influencing the creation of the
WCA was more significant than the timely action of Wisconsin
Governor Patrick J. Lucey. Prior to his decision to veto piecemeal,
creditor-sponsored legislation, the consumer-finance company rate increase bill had nearly passed the legislature without its two-year time
limitation. In addition, there were no foreseeable obstacles in the
path of the bank and retailer legislation. By taking the position that
he did, Governor Lucey forced the creditors to choose between doing without legislation they desired or accepting comprehensive
legislation. In addition, by instructing the legislature to take up
A.B. 1057, Governor Lucey greatly reduced any possibility that the
comprehensive legislation would be based on the UCCC. By clearly
placing his confidence in the proponents of A.B. 1057, the Governor,
in substance, vested these individuals with the authority to speak
for all consumer groups. Since each of these was a critical factor, the
Governor had a tremendous impact on both the formation of the
consumer-creditor coalition and on the direction of the negotiations.
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3. The Split in the Credit Community

The position taken by the Governor set the stage for the split in
the credit community. Only the banks, retailers, and consumer
finance companies stood to gain by supporting comprehensive legislation. However, while they were certainly in an uncomfortable
position, they were not helpless. Since consumers needed creditor
support to obtain passage of comprehensive legislation, these creditors could certainly have forced a stalemate. Assuming that sympathy
for consumer interests was not rapidly on the increase in the legislature, time was on the side of the creditors. The only creditors who
were under any serious time pressure were the large retailers, primarily because of the possibility of continued liability for usury
violations and the adverse publicity arising out of the Penney 'case.
The banks and finance companies could probably have afforded to
wait for rate increases. It seems to me, then, that if the entire credit
community had refused to work within the framework of A.B. 1057,
and if they offered to negotiate at least some substantial changes in
Wisconsin law, the Governor might eventually have backed down to
some extent. Creditor solidarity in Wisconsin could then have resulted in far weaker legislation.
The responsibility for the split, it seems to me, rests almost wholly
with the banks. The national retailers are not nearly as influential in
the Wisconsin credit community as are the Wisconsin banks. Although the support of the retailers at first-stage negotiations was
helpful, the participation of the banks was the critical element.
Why did the Wisconsin banks participate? Certainly their in•
terest in a rate increase was central to their decision. An additional
factor, however, should not be underemphasized: The banks were
not intimidated by the prospect of comprehensive consumer-credit
legislation. They had the foresight to know that such legislation was,
to some extent, inevitable and that the legitimate creditor has nothing to fear from such legislation if it is sensibly drafted and responsive to the interests of all affected groups. If agreement on
sensible legislation could be reached, the banks saw that it would be
the most direct route to the legislation they desired. Hence, they took
the position that, if the proponents of Original A.B. 1057 were willing to negotiate substantial modifications in the bill, they would
be willing to give their support.
Soon after the banks had begun serious negotiations with consumer representatives, the representatives of the retail merchants
joined the discussions, and the first-stage coalition was formed. By
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the end of first-stage negotiations, many of the most severe bank and
retailer objections to Original A.B. 1057 had been resolved, and
the negotiators had become confident that most of their remaining
differences could be ironed out. With such influential creditors
backing the bill, a number of other creditors, such as the credit
unions, the savings and loan associations, and the farm-implement
dealers, joined the bandwagon. Whereas six months previously it
had appeared that these creditors would gain nothing by supporting
A.B. 1057, the staunch support of the banks and retailers had changed
matters considerably. Since A.B. 1057 now appeared to have a good
chance of passage, new groups were willing to trade their support of
the bill for concessions in their specific areas of interest.
From the standpoint of the coalition's strength, the most important creditor group to enter the second-stage negotiations was the
consumer finance companies. While they were confident that with
the help of the automobile finance companies they could block passage of the WCA, they realized that such action would make it
difficult to obtain legislative approval for increases in interest rates.
Moreover, many reputable consumer finance companies desired
comprehensive legislation. They felt that many abuses in the consumer-credit field were unjustly attributed to the substantial consumer finance companies; supporting comprehensive reform could
only enhance their reputation. Many consumer finance companies
also saw consumer-credit reform as inevitable but believed that
piecemeal legislation might suffer from overkill. Sensible comprehensive legislation seemed a better alternative.
Accordingly, the consumer finance companies supported the
adoption of some form of the UCCC in Wisconsin. They held fast
to this position until January 1972, primarily because of doubts
that negotiations with the proponents of A.B. 1057 would be fruitful. Having seen the significant results of first-stage negotiations,
most consumer credit companies joined the negotiations. 288

4. The Unquestioned Authority of the Consumer
Representatives
A common legislative problem in dealing with consumer representatives is that there are normally quite a few of them, each with
his own ideas as to what consumers want. There was no such confusion in Wisconsin. Governor Lucey had, in substance, told credi288. Household Finance Corporation had long been a staunch supporter of national
adoption of the UCCC. Hence, it opposed the WCA to the end. See note 45 supra.
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tors that if they could come to terms with the proponents of A.B.
1057, he would support the result. Given this strong backing, the
proponents of A.B. 1057 were in a position to be able to deliver the
support of nearly all consumer groups. Rarely do consumer representatives have this kind of unquestioned authority. It was, in my
opinion, critical both to the creditors' willingness to enter the coalition and to the consumer representatives' ability to negotiate effectively.

5. Personalities
As is probably always the case in such situations, personalities
played an important role in the formation of the consumer-creditor
coalition, especially at the very beginning of first-stage negotiations.
All parties to the first-stage negotiations approached the negotiations
with caution. Although the banks were in an uncomfortable position, they did not regard the prospect of continuing without a rate
increase to be a total disaster. Hence, they were not to be pressured
into supporting legislation, such as Original A.B. 1057, that would
severely prejudice their interests, While the retailers may have felt
a little more pressure than the banks, primarily because of their po•
tential liability for usury violations, they too approached negotia•
tions cautiously. Consumer representatives were similarly circumspect; they had no intention of supporting a watered-down package
that did not substantially change existing Wisconsin law. Conse•
quently, it was essential to the formation of any coalition that the
representatives consider each other to be reasonable and sensitive
to all legitimate interests. This is, of course, what happened.
The creditor representatives willingly agreed that in many instances consumers had suffered serious abuse and that in those cases
sensibly drafted legislation was needed. Similarly, while consumer
representatives felt that there was a great need for change, they
hoped that change could be achieved through means that would have
a minimal cost impact on the credit community; they were well
aware that creditor costs would be passed on to the consumer to the
extent possible. Although they shared the general objectives of the
NCA, none of the Wisconsin consumer representatives had participated in the drafting of the NCA, so they were not personally committed to its specific provisions. They took the position that they
would be willing to make sweeping changes if it could be rationally
shmm that A.B. 1057 was unworkable as written or that their objectives could be achieved through means more acceptable to the credit
community. With the early development of mutual respect and the
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mutual discovery that meaningful results were possible, senous
first-stage negotiations began.
6. Original A.B. 1057-the Framework for
the Negotiations
One of the most influential factors regarding the total content of
the WCA is that the negotiations were based on Original A.B. 1057,
rather than on the DCCC. As a result, the creditors were always in
the position of arguing for change, and the consumer representatives
were in the position of resisting change. Clearly, the consumer representatives had inertia on their side.
In addition, a negotiator has only a finite amount of influence,
which is dissipated to some extent with every concession he receives.
Hence, creditor representatives were forced to marshall their "influence points'' and expend them only on the matters most critical
to their interests. The result was that many original provisions
remained unchanged or only slightly changed, not because creditor
representatives were unconcerned about them, but simply because
creditors were more concerned with other matters. Probably the best
example of this phenomenon is the WCA penalty structure. The
W~A provides remedies and penalties in varying degrees for violations 0£ its provisions. In many cases, substantial penalties are imposed for what many creditors consider to be relatively harmless
violations.289 Yet, due to the concern ·with other areas of the bill,
creditor representatives never objected to the penalty structure.
289. This is true, for example, of restrictions on debt collection practices. For
example, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 407.104 provides:
(1) In attempting to collect an alleged debt arising from a consumer credit transaction, a debt collector shall not:
(f) D1sclose or threaten to disclose information concerning the existence of a
debt known to be reasonably disputed by the customer without disclosing the
fact that the customer disputes the debt;
(i) Claitn, or attempt or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or reason
to know that the right does not exist;

(l} Threaten action against the tustomer unless the action is taken in regular
course or is intended with respect to the particular debt.
Violation of this section sttbjects the creditor to the greater of (I) twice the finance
charge involved in the transaction (but not less than 100 dollars or more than 1000
dollars) or (2) actual damages sustained by the customer. Wisconsin Consumer Act
§ 425.304. "Actual damages may include mental anguish with or without accompanying
physical injury." Wisconsin Consumer Act § 427.105(1), See generally Holbrook &:
Bugge, supra note 284, at 46.
Similarly, the inclusion of an unenforceable confession 0£ judgment clause in a
consumer contract renders the entire transaction void, and the customer is entitled to
retain the proceeds of the transaction without obligation. Wisconsin Consumer Act
§§ 422.405, 425.305.
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While the fact that negotiations were based on Original A.B.
1057 affected all creditors, its impact was greatest on those creditors
with the least influence in the negotiations. Thus, while it probably
did not severely affect the banks, its impact was undoubtedly felt
by door-to-door sellers, independent furniture dealers, debt collectors, and the automobile finance companies.

7. How the Negotiators Made Their Decisions
One factor that is probably critical to the outcome of any negotiations is the manner in which negotiators determine what their clients want: When faced with a decision between two alternatives,
how is the choice made? The creditor representative has no serious
problem here. He knows his client well, his client's interests are
normally clear, and he can consult with his client if the need arises.
Representing consumers, however, is a far different matter. The
client is unmanageably large, impossible to communicate with in
any meaningful sense, and has widely varying, often contradictory,
interests.
The process through which the Wisconsin consumer representatives made their decisions was very similar to the procedure I have
followed in analyzing their work product: They first tried to identify what the problem was, they thought about the alternative solutions, and they made some substantial guesses. Of course, identifying
the problem was the critical step. Here, the Wisconsin consumer
representatives relied heavily on personal experience, obtained primarily through work in legal aid clinics. Since reliable empirical
information is rarely available, personal experience with the problems of the poor was probably as good a basis on which to rely as
any. Moreover, since most of the provisions of the WCA are aimed
at alleviating the problems of the poor, the Wisconsin consumer
representatives were probably as well-equipped as anyone could be
to identify accurately the problems most in need of attention.
Regarding the problems of the middle class, however-and this
includes the vast majority of automobile buyers-the Wisconsin
consumer representatives had no particular expertise. In fact, considering the general dearth of empirical data in this area, no one
may have the necessary expertise. At any rate, the Wisconsin consumer
representatives were forced to make their choices on the basis of
common sense, hearsay, and the scant empirical research of others.
They were often forced to guess at answers to such questions as:
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How many consumers ,;viii benefit from a right to cure? How many
will benefit from notice and opportunity to object to repossession?
In these areas I believe there is the greatest likelihood that the WCA
has struck an improper balance. I should emphasize that I have no
serious criticism of the choices made in Wisconsin: The answers
are just as elusive to me as they were to the Wisconsin negotiators.
However, the decisions made in this area were critical to the ultimate shaping of the WCA. Consequently, since they were largely
based on assumption, the impact of the WCA should qe monitored
particularly closely in this area, and all parties should be open to
change if the benefits turn out to be miniscule in light of increased
costs.
Creditors generally made their decisions on the basis of data
from their own records. For example, in order to determine the possible impact of a particular deficiency cutoff point, creditors could
look to their records to evaluate the prospective costs. The various
alternatives could then be more rationally weighed. However, creditors also did some guessing, especially as to what impact various
provisions would have on the average customer's attitude toward
debt.

8. The Disparity in Resources
Whereas creditor representatives generally had an unlimited
source of manpower available to them, the resources of the Wisconsin consumer representatives were very limited. On occasion, consumer representatives simply were unable to amass the information
necessary to present a satisfactory argument for their point of view
and were forced to back down. For example, when negotiators were
faced with a difficult policy issue, creditors would often base their
arguments on self-generated data. The limited consumer resources
made it impossible to evaluate carefully such statistics or to generate
contrasting data. Therefore, the Wisconsin consumer representatives
were probably not as effective as they might otherwise have been.

9. The Nonparticipation of Automobile Finance
Companies

As I have suggested at some length,290 the nonparticipation of
the automobile finance companies in the negotiations may have been
290. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
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a significant factor, for they almost certainly could have exacted at
1east a few noteworthy consumer concessions in exchange for their
support of the WCA.
B. ·what the WCA Means for Other States

The complex situation that occurred in Wisconsin is not likely
to be duplicated in other states, so not all the factors critical to the
creation of the WCA will be important elsewhere. Yet, there will
undoubtedly be similarities between the problems facing consumers
in other states and those that faced consumers in Wisconsin. For
example, the passage of comprehensive consumer protection in nearly all states will presumably require at least some cooperation on the
part of creditors. I doubt that in many state legislatures consumer
sympathy runs so high that creditor forces can simply be overpowered.
A few basic lessons can be learned from the Wisconsin experience, some less surprising than others. First, unsurprisingly, a strong
consumer political position is essential to the passage of far-reaching
legislation. Second, and perhaps a little surprising to some, creditors
are not monolithic. They have diverse, sometimes contradictory interests; they have different attitudes toward change; and they make
their own decisions. Hence, they can be split. Third, the experience
of the automobile finance companies suggests that if comprehensive
1egislation ultimately passes, those creditors who did not participate
in itS design will probably have made a mistake. Fourth, the existence of realistic consumer leaders capable of delivering the support
of most consumer groups is essential to effective cooperation between
consumers and creditors.
The political atmosphere in each state and the factors contributing to political influence generally are extremely diverse. It would
hardly seem worthwhile to attempt here to predict the future of consumer political influence in other states. To be sure, consumer consciousness in the United States has increased significantly in the past
few years. If this increase continues, sympathy for consumers in state
legislatures is sure to follow. Yet, it is quite possible that awareness
of consumer problems will prove to be a cyclical phenomenon and
will soon begin to :wane. If so, the WCA may be the national highwater mark in consumer-credit protection. In any event, it is not
likely to have much significance for other states until consciousness
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of const1mer needs reaches substantial proportions. Once cotlsumer
forces within a particular state begin to gain strength, however, the
WCA could and should in:fltience the legislative process in a number
of ways. It may, :for instance, be the starting point for consumercreditor negotiations. Since the WCA arose out of negotiations in
which the competing patties enjoyed substantially equal bargaining
positions, it already represents a great deal of compromise by both
sides. Moreover, even if negotiations in other states do Iiot begin
with the WCA, it still provides an excellent reference.
I£ consumer strength reaches the point where some change is
imminent, the Wisconsin experience should soften creditor resistance
to change. Many creditors fear that substantial change will have disastrous effects. They fear that far-reaching legislation will not only
complicate their operations, but also undermine the customer's attitude toward debt. A creditor who envisions such a calamity, whether
his fears are founded or unfounded, is not likely to support change.
The broad creditor support ultimately enjoyed by the WCA shows
that many Wisconsin creditors were eventually ~onvinced they could
live with the WCA. Moreover, if after a few years under the WCA
the Wisconsin consumer-credit community is alive and well, general
creditor apprehension of impending doom should begin to subside.
The WCA should soften creditor resistance to change in another
way-through the example of what happened to the automobile
finance companies. Once change is imminent, it is clearly to the advantage of the creditor to participate in the negotiations. No draftsman can be expected to foresee all the likely effects of a particular
restriction. The realistic consumer representative wants to know, to
the extent possible, how the proposed legislation will affect the creditors in his state.
Perhaps the WCA may influence the legislative process in other
states most significantly by illustrating what can be accomplished by
capable, open, and cohesive consumer forces. Even if consumer
awareness runs high in the state, and ~ven if a few influential creditors are willing to negotiate, meaningful results are not likely if
consumer forces are fragmented or if consumer representatives do
not realistically view the functional relationship between consumers
and creditors. Consumer representatives must realize that what is
bad for creditors is not necessarily good for consumers. No creditor
will be willing to cooperate with consumer representatives who, as
is often the case, do not understand this. Equally important, if not
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more so, no creditor will be willing to cooperate with representatives
of only a few of the consumer groups within the state. To expend a
large amount of energy reaching an accord with one consumer representative makes Jittle sense if the result is opposed by other consumer groups.
Accordingly, if the WCA induces consumer forces in other states
to unite under capable leadership, it will indeed have a meaningful
impact outside Wisconsin.

